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LAST RESORT: THE THREAT OF FEDERAL




On January 20, 2004, President George W. Bush, in his State of the
Union Address, highlighted the growing problem of steroids in professional
sports. 1 President Bush cited the importance of athletics in our society and
focused on the fact that professional athletes are role models for America's
children. 2 He stated that the use of performance-enhancing drugs by
professional athletes has been sending the wrong message to the nation's
youth.3
Despite these strong words .and intense pressure from Congress, it took
the imminent threat of federal steroid legislation for the Major League
Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) to agree to a testing policy that
effectively deals with the President's and Congress's concerns. 4  On
November 15, 2005, Major League Baseball (MLB) and the MLBPA
amended the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for the second time,5
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
John D. Feerick, Jeffrey L. Kessler, and Courtney Domercq for their insight and guidance.
1. See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 40
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 94, 100 (Jan. 20, 2004) [hereinafter State of Union].
2. Id.
3. Id. President Bush focused on the moral implications of the messages transmitted by
professional athletes using performance enhancing drugs: "that there are shortcuts to
accomplishment and that performance is more important than character." Id. Since that time,
Congress has added a health and safety rationale for combating the use of performance-
enhancing substances in professional sports. See Restoring Faith in America's Pastime:
Evaluating Major League Baseball's Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 5-8 (2005) [hereinafter MLB House
Hearing] (statement of Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman, House Comm. on Government Reform);
see also Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005).
4. Steroid Penalties Much Tougher with Agreement, ESPN.com, Nov. 15, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2224832.
5. Press Release, Major League Baseball Players Ass'n/Major League Baseball, MLB,
MLBPA Announce New Drug Agreement (Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter MLBPAIMLB Press
Release], available at http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/news/press-releases/
pressrelease.jsp?ymd=20051115&content id=1268552&vkey=pr mlb&fext=.jsp&cid=mlb.
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just one week before the proposed steroid legislation-the Integrity in
Professional Sports Act (IPSA)-was likely to pass.6  Despite this
agreement, IPSA will not be withdrawn. 7 According to Senator Jim
Bunning, the bill will remain on the table to ensure that, "if things unravel,
we still have tough legislation we can move through Congress," 8 and
because Congress wants to "see what the other major league sports do."9
The imminent threat of federal legislation produced a testing system in
baseball that Congress feels is sufficient to clean up professional sports.' 0
However, the actual adoption of the proposed legislation could very well be
unconstitutional."1 The federal drug testing legislation, which mandates
suspicionless testing, could possibly implicate the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches. 12  Therefore, two critical
questions must be answered in order to determine the constitutionality of
federal steroid legislation: first, whether the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches applies to a federally mandated private
employer search, and second, if the Fourth Amendment does apply, whether
this threatened legislation can pass constitutional muster.13 IPSA facially
applies to all professional sports; 14 however, this Note focuses on its
The penalties for positive tests are now a fifty game suspension for the first offense, a one-
hundred game suspension for the second offense, and a lifetime ban for the third offense. Id.
There are now criminal penalties for possession and distribution. Id. For the prior penalty
structure, see infra notes 73-74, 80 and accompanying text.
6. Steroid Penalties Much Tougher with Agreement, supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. Brian Costello & Mike Vaccaro, Baseball's Big Ban: Sport Flexes Its Muscles, N.Y.
Post, Nov. 16, 2005, at 76; Steroid Penalties Much Tougher with Agreement, supra note 4.
9. Steroid Penalties Much Tougher with Agreement, supra note 4.
10. See Carl Bialik & Jason Fry, Baseball's New Steroids Policy Wins Praise from
Columnists, wsj.com, Nov. 16, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/article/the -daily-fix.html (paid
subscription required) (explaining the mostly positive reception of the new MLB
performance-enhancing drug policy).
11. See S. 1114, The Clean Sports Act of 2005, and S. 1334, the Professional Sports
Integrity and Accountability Act Before S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 109th Cong. 21-22 (2005) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of
Donald M. Fehr, Executive Director, MLBPA); see also Murray Chass, Steroid Tests Ignore
the 4th Amendment, N.Y. Times, June 2, 2005, at D2. For a discussion of why the Major
League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), widely regarded as one the most powerful
unions in professional sports, would cave into Major League Baseball (MLB) and
Congress's demands even though the proposed legislation might be unconstitutional, see
infra note 405 and accompanying text.
12. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (finding the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches applicable to suspicionless
drug and alcohol testing of railway workers employed by private railroad companies). The
Fourth Amendment could apply despite the fact that the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches "does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one,
effected by a private party on his own initiative," and MLB is in the private sector. Id. at
614; see infra Parts IC, II.A (discussing the constitutional significance of MLB being part of
the private sector).
13. See infra Parts IC, I.D, II.A, II.B.
14. See Steroid Use in Sports, Part II: Examining the National Football League's
Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances Before H. Comm. on Government
Reform, 109th Cong. 5-8 (2005) [hereinafter NFL House Hearing] (statement of Rep. Tom
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application to MLB because the failure of MLB and the MLBPA to deal
with steroids was the primary impetus behind the federal legislation. 15
The threatened legislation was central to Congress's success in inducing
MLB and the MLBPA to agree to a more stringent testing policy. 16 Both
the Senate and the House have proposed bills that would govern
performance-enhancing drug testing in MLB and the other major
professional sports. 17 Yet, as recently as November 1, 2005, even the
possible threat of federal legislation did not prompt any further changes to
MLB's testing provisions. 18  In reintroducing federal drug testing
legislation for professional sports and making the adoption of at least one of
the bills seemingly imminent, Senator Bunning stated, "Hopefully
Congress' action will light a fire under their feet to come to an agreement
before we do it for them."'19 Senator Bunning was correct.
Part I of this Note explains the current landscape of steroids in MLB and
explores the historical background that led to the current controversy which,
in turn, brought about the threat of federal legislation.20 It presents the
pending bills in the Senate and the House and looks at the potential
constitutional problems of the legislation. 2 1 While examining some of the
distinguishing features of the proposed bills, this Note mainly focuses on
the version of IPSA that would have been before the Senate on November
22, 2005.22 Finally, Part I explains the framework necessary for analyzing
the constitutionality of the threatened legislation.23
Davis, Chairman, House Comm. on Government Reform); See Steroid Use in Sports Part
IX." Examining the National Basketball Association's Steroid Testing Program Before H.
Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 5-8 (2005) [hereinafter NBA House Hearing]
(statement of Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman, House Comm. on Government Reform).
15. See NFL House Hearing, supra note 14 (statement of Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman,
House Comi. on Government Reform); see also infra note 59 and accompanying text
(explaining why the steroid problem in MLB precipitated the threatened legislation).
16. Senator Jim Bunning stated, "I think the attention that Congress has given this issue
and my bill's movement certainly had something to do with the parties coming to an
agreement." Press Release, Sen. Jim Bunning, Statement by Senator Jim Bunning on
Today's Agreement Between Major League Baseball and Its Players' Union to Impose
Tougher Penalties on Players Who Use Steroids (Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Bunning Press
Release], available at http://bunning.senate.gov/index.cfin?fuseaction=PressReleases.
Detail&PressRelease id= 140 1 &Month = 11 &Year=2005.
17. See Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill will
apply to MLB, Minor League Baseball, the National Football League (NFL), the National
Basketball Association (NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL). Id. § 4(7).
18. See With No Action by Baseball, Steroids Bill Re-Introduced, ESPN.com, Apr. 12,
2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=2210204.
19. Id. The change in player penalties represents the first step back that Congress has
taken throughout their involvement. Compare Steroid Penalties Much Tougher with
Agreement, supra note 4 (explaining the change in the bill to a lifetime ban after the third
positive test rather than the second), with S. 1960 (originally providing for lifetime ban after
a second positive test).
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. See S. 1960.
23. See infra Part I.C-D.
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Part II of this Note presents arguments both for and against the
constitutionality of the federally mandated testing. Assuming the Fourth
Amendment does apply, Part II then discusses whether the "special
needs" 24 for the proposed legislation requiring suspicionless searches are
sufficient to withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 25
Part III concludes that the legislation in its proposed form is
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 26 Because the circumstances
warrant a "special needs" exception, the legislation meets the constitutional
standards of the Fourth Amendment. 27
I. STEROIDS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, CONGRESSIONAL REACTION, AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment states,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. 28
It protects against unreasonable searches.29 Generally, searches that are
conducted without both probable cause and individualized suspicion are not
considered reasonable. 30 However, in some cases suspicionless searches
are considered constitutional.3' In making this determination, whether the
Fourth Amendment applies to the search in question, the significance of the
invasion of privacy, the nature of the privacy interest affected and the
nature of the intrusion, and the Government's legitimate interest supporting
the search are the essential factors. 32
Part L.A sets forth the current dilemma of steroids in professional sports,
particularly MLB, and follows the historical progression that led to the
pervasive problem of steroids in MLB. Part I.B details the current forms of
the proposed legislation, focusing on IPSA. Part I.C explains the
24. See infra Part IID.
25. There is also a question as to the application of this legislation to the Canada-based
Toronto Blue Jays, the scope of which is beyond the focus of this Note. For further
discussion of that issue, see generally Sarah E. Armstrong, Note, Students, Drugs and Extra-
Curricular Activities: Problems and Possibilities for Random Drug Testing in Canada, 13
Educ. & L.J. 343 (2004).
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part III.
28. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
29. Id.
30. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); cf Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 603 (1980) (holding a warrantless search unconstitutional
under a reasonableness standard); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 395 (1978) (same).
31. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ, v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828-29 (2002). The Court in Skinner
stated that "a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a
search must be presumed unreasonable." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
32. See infra Part I.D.
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framework for determining whether the Fourth Amendment is applicable to
the search mandated by the proposed legislation. Part I.D discusses the
application of the Fourth Amendment to the proposed legislation. Part
I.D. 1 lays out the balancing test for determining whether a search is
reasonable. Part I.D.2 works through the important Supreme Court
precedent for suspicionless drug testing.
A. Steroids in MLB
The issue of steroids in professional sports, particularly baseball, is at the
forefront of our nation's consciousness for several reasons; two of the key
reasons constitute the purpose for the enactment of IPSA. 33 First, steroids
endanger the health and safety of the nation. 34 Second, steroid use destroys
the integrity of baseball, commonly referred to as "America's pastime." 35
The health and safety rationale was introduced indirectly by President
Bush in his 2004 State of the Union Address. 36 President Bush focused on
the fact that athletes as role models have a responsibility to help America's
children make the right choices. 37 Representative Tom Davis, Chairman of
the House Committee on Government Reform and a sponsor of the Clean
Sports Act of 2005,38 stated that Congress's "primary focus remains on the
message being sent to children."'39
The proposed legislation directly links the use of performance-enhancing
drugs by professional athletes to the health and safety of the nation.40 It
focuses on the direct health and safety concerns for the athletes themselves
and for the derivative effect that steroid use by MLB players has on
children and teenagers. 41 Focusing on the impact of steroids on the nation's
children, Representative Davis, in his opening statement at the House
33. See Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005).
34. See State of Union, supra note 1; MLB House Hearing, supra note 3, at 5-8
(statement of Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman, House Comm. on Government Reform); see, e.g.,
MLB House Hearing, supra note 3, at 116-17 (testimony of Denise A. Garibaldi, Ph.D.)
(explaining how steroid abuse by her son, to potentially compete at the NCAA and Major
League level, led to his severe depression and eventual suicide); see also infra notes 43-45
and accompanying text.
35. See S. 1960; see also infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
36. See State of Union, supra note 1, at 100.
37. See id.
38. Clean Sports Act, H.R. 2565, 109th Cong. (2005).
39. MLB House Hearing, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman,
House Comm. on Government Reform).
40. See S. 1960; H.R. 2565.
41. See S. 1960. For an alternative view as to the ability of the proposed legislation to
combat the derivative use of steroids by children and teenagers, see Eradicating Steroid Use,
Part IV: Examining the Use of Steroids by Young Women to Enhance Athletic Performance
and Body Image Before H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 54 (2005)
[hereinafter Women & Steroids House Hearing] (testimony of Diane L. Elliot, M.D.,
Professor of Medicine, Oregon Health & Science University). Dr. Elliot testified, "It also is
unrealistic to think that drug testing professional athletes will clean up boys' locker rooms.
Elite athletes are but one influence on young males [sic] performance enhancing drug use."
Id.
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Committee on Government Reform's hearing on steroids, stated, "Too
many college athletes believe they have to consider steroids if they're going
to make it to the pros; high school athletes, in turn, think steroids might be
the key to getting a scholarship." 42
Representative Davis later referred to steroids as a "national public health
crisis." 43 Data from 1999 through 2003 compiled by the Risk Surveillance
System at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention show an increase
in steroid use by high school students over the last fourteen years. 44 Steroid
use by high school students increased from 2.7% fourteen years ago to
6.1% according to the 2003 study.45
The second goal of Congress is to "promote the integrity of professional
sports." 46  Steroids have tarnished the integrity of baseball, and thus,
implementing standards that will eradicate the use of steroids can return
integrity to America's pastime. 47 For example, a USA Today poll revealed
that seventy-nine percent of MLB players surveyed believe that steroids
were a factor in the record breaking performances by the game's superstars
over the last decade. 48 Hank Aaron, a member of the MLB Hall of Fame
and the all-time home run record holder with 755 home runs, stated before
the Senate, "I also just want to make sure that whatever we do, we make
sure that we clean up baseball. '49
42. MLB House Hearing, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman,
House Comm. on Government Reform).
43. See Erik Brady, Dick Patrick & Andrea Stone, Congress' Muscle Shapes Steroid
Debate, USA Today, June 23, 2005, at IA.
44. Richard Obert, High Schools Are Latest Target in Battle Against Steroids, Ariz.
Republic, July 28, 2005, at Cl.
45. Id. Representative Davis also provided data showing an increase in steroid use in his
opening remarks before the House Committee on Government Reform's Hearings on MLB's
Steroid Policy. MLB House Hearing, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Rep. Tom Davis,
Chairman, House Comm. on Government Reform). The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention reported that more than 500,000 high school students have tried steroids, a
threefold increase over the last ten years. Id. The survey by the National Institute on Drug
Abuse and the University of Michigan highlighted that over forty percent of twelfth graders
described steroids as "fairly easy" or "very easy" to obtain, and that only fifty-six percent of
high school students in 2004 perceived steroids as harmful as opposed to seventy-one
percent in 1992. Id.
46. See S. 1960.
47. See id.
48. MLB House Hearing, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman,
House Comm. on Government Reform).




Steroids have damaged the historical integrity of baseball.50 They have
placed a question mark next to the historical significance of the incredible
home run numbers that have been put up over the last decade. 5 1 This
debate was at the forefront of the 2006 season as Barry Bonds, the forty-
two-year-old San Francisco Giants outfielder who has admitted in grand
jury testimony that he took steroids unknowingly and who is closely
connected with two people who have pleaded guilty to steroid-related
offenses, passed Babe Ruth for second on the all-time home run list and
will probably break Hank Aaron's all-time home run record in the 2007
season.5 2 Senator Bunning said that he was "disappointed the new policy
50. This has been shown by the purpose of the Integrity in Professional Sports Act
(IPSA), the opinion of the majority of MLB players, and by the fan's outrage at the steroid
scandal. See S. 1960; MLB House Hearing, supra note 3, at 5-8 (statement of Rep. Tom
Davis, Chairman, House Comm. on Government Reform); Mark Hyman, Steroid Scandal?
Pass the Peanuts: Do Fans Care Half as Much as a Few Politicos and Media Scolds?, Bus.
Week, Dec. 20, 2004, at 44, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04 51 /b3913058_mz0 11 .htm (explaining a
2004 ESPN.com fan poll that showed ninety-three percent of fans "said that using steroids is
wrong and taints the sport").
51. Statistics are vital to MLB. See Wikipedia, Baseball Statistics,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baseballstatistics (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). Senator John
McCain asked Hank Aaron what should be done about the records that may or may not have
been influenced by steroids. Fehr: New Steroids Policy Could Happen by Series, supra note
49. Aaron did not suggest a solution. Id. Since 1998, Roger Maris's single-season home-run
record of sixty-one home runs set in 1961 has been broken six times: once by Barry Bonds,
who hit seventy-three home runs in the 2001 season and who now holds the single season
home run record, twice by Mark McGwire, and three times by Sammy Sosa. ESPN.com,
MLB-All-Time Single-Season Home Run Leaders,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlbhist/alltime/leaders?breakdown=0&type=0&sort=8&year-=
(last visited Oct. 21, 2006). Barry Bonds has been linked to steroids. See infra note 52.
Mark McGwire has also been said to have used steroids; a trainer who was associated with
the Oakland Athletics and Mark McGwire in 1988, and the target of an undercover FBI
investigation, allegedly provided Mark McGwire with steroids. Shaun Assael & Peter
Keating, Who Knew?, ESPN Mag., Nov. 21, 2005, at 69, 72-73. The trainer's "training-
session notes show he put McGwire on a mix of Winstrol V, testosterone and the veterinary
steroid Equipoise." Id. at 73. McGwire declined comment on the article just as he declined
to comment on steroid use before the House Committee on Government Reform. Id. Before
the Committee, McGwire stated, "My lawyers have advised me that I cannot answer these
questions without jeopardizing my friends, my family, or myself. I intend to follow their
advice." MLB House Hearing, supra note 3, at 224-25 (statement of Mark McGwire).
McGwire's approach to the congressional hearing was not well received-Representative
Patrick McHenry said, "I walked into that hearing a fan of Mark McGwire and walked away
greatly disappointed .... His reactions to the questions that day just seemed to be
stonewalling." House: '[Chances are] Getting Better and Better,' ESPN.com, Aug. 7, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2127848.
52. The evidence that Barry Bonds has used steroids is overwhelming. "Barry Bonds
told a federal grand jury that he used a clear substance and a cream supplied by the
Burlingame laboratory now enmeshed in a sports doping scandal, but he said he never
thought they were steroids." Lance Williams & Mark Fainaru-Wada, What Bonds Told
BALCO Grand Jury, S.F. Chron., Dec. 3, 2004, at Al [hereinafter Williams & Fainaru-
Wada, Bonds and BALCO Grand Jury]. Details of the grand jury transcripts were included
in Lance Williams and Mark Fainaru-Wada's book Game of Shadows. See generally Mark
Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, Game of Shadows: Barry Bonds, BALCO, and the
Steroids Scandal that Rocked Professional Sports (2006). Williams and Fainaru-Wada were
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wouldn't erase records set with the help of performance-enhancing
drugs." 53
The impact of steroids on baseball became even clearer recently when the
first Hall of Fame-caliber player, Rafael Palmeiro, tested positive for
steroids. 54 Despite telling Congress that he has "never used steroids" while
passionately waiving his finger, Palmeiro will not face perjury charges for
his positive test that occurred after he testified due to lack of evidence that
he had taken steroids at the time of or before the hearing. 55 The Palmeiro
imprisoned for refusing to reveal the leak of the sealed grand jury testimony. Reporters Who
Refused to Reveal BALCO Leak Get Prison, ESPN.com, Sep. 22, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=2597854. This all leads to the inevitable
conclusion that Barry Bonds did use steroids. Moreover, Bonds' personal trainer, Greg
Anderson, pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute steroids to professional baseball players
and was sentenced to three months in prison and three months home confinement. Lance
Williams & Mark Fainaru-Wada, Short Prison Terms for BALCO Defendants: Judge Blasts
Steroid Dealer for Continuing to Protect His Superstar Drug Clients, S.F. Chron., Oct. 19,
2005, at Al [hereinafter Williams & Fainaru-Wada, BALCO Defendants]. Greg Anderson
has also been incarcerated twice because he would not testify before a grand jury
investigating whether Barry Bonds committed perjury when Bonds testified before the grand
jury that he never "knowingly" used steroids. Bonds' Trainer Freed from Prison After Legal
'Snafu,' ESPN.com, Oct. 6, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section-mlb&id=
2615056. Anderson has appealed his imprisonment for contempt on several points, but the
only point of his appeal that has not been rejected by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit is "Anderson's ... contention ... that a secret, illegally-recorded tape of him
discussing Bonds' steroid use is the basis for the grand jury questions he refuses to answer."
Id. For the opinion issued concerning the case against Anderson and the controversial sports
medicine/nutrition center Bay Area Laboratory Co-operative (BALCO), see United States v.
Conte, No. CR 04-0044, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25896 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2004).
53. Steroid Penalties Much Tougher with Agreement, supra note 4.
54. Congress Won't Charge Palmeiro with Perjury, ESPN.com, Nov. 11, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id-2219460.
55. Id. ("[Representative Tom] Davis said the steroid for which [Rafael] Palmeiro tested
positive is detectable for three to four weeks, shorter than the gap between his failed [drug]
test and Capitol Hill appearance, and, therefore could not have been in his system the day he
testified." (internal quotation marks omitted)). At the close of the 2005 season, Palmeiro had
hit 569 home runs and had 3020 hits. He is one of only four players in baseball history to
have hit 500 home runs and amassed 3000 hits. Id. "Palmeiro, 41, had just two hits in 26 at-
bats after returning from his suspension and was booed by spectators at Baltimore and on the
road. He was sent home to Texas to rehabilitate injuries; the [Baltimore] Orioles eventually
told him not to return to the team." Id. In a statement released after Congress announced it
would not charge Palmeiro with perjury, Palmeiro stated, "I have never intentionally taken
steroids." Id. Palmeiro's explanation for what may have possibly caused his failed steroid
test is a tainted vial of liquid B-12 given to him by teammate Miguel Tejada, which
Palmeiro's wife later injected into Palmeiro. Id. Palmeiro's questionable reaction to his
undeniable positive test stands in stark contrast with that of New York Yankees first-
baseman Jason Giambi, who apologized, although not specifically for taking steroids, after it
was released that he had admitted to the grand jury that he had taken steroids. Giambi
Apologizes But Won't Say the "S" Word, ESPN.com, Feb. 11, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section--mlb&id=1989018. It was also revealed that
Giambi had taken human growth hormone.(HGH). See Assael & Keating, supra note 51, at
83. Giambi's approach turned out to be successful. Despite a litany of boos and taunts
exacerbated by a slow start, Giambi finished the year strong. He hit .271 with thirty-two
home runs and eighty-seven RBI's, was re-embraced by the fans, and was voted American
League Comeback Player of the Year. Griffey, Giambi Named Comeback Players of '05,
ESPN.com, Oct. 6, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2182725.
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incident "has been cited as one of the reasons lawmakers have continued to
pursue legislation to require tougher rules for steroid testing and harsher
penalties for positive tests in baseball and other major professional sports
leagues." 56
The two reasons for the legislation discussed above, the health and safety
of the nation and the integrity of baseball, 57 highlight why congressional
intervention was needed-MLB's steroid policy was not strong enough.5 8
While the bills remain on the table as an incentive mainly to ensure baseball
follows through on its plan and for the other professional sports leagues to
take the steps that MLB has taken, the failure of MLB and the MLBPA to
deal with steroids was the primary impetus behind the federal legislation.59
Therefore, before examining the proposed legislation, it is necessary to look
at the evidence that baseball's approach to steroid testing had indeed
failed.60
The problem has been brewing for a long time. 61 In 1991, MLB banned
steroids through a memo entitled Baseball's Drug Policy and Prevention
Program, but there was no testing program in place to effectuate the ban on
steroids. 62 Kansas City Royals General Manager (GM) from 1990-2000,
Herk Robinson, said steroids were added to the banned substances in the
1991 memo because of rumors about Jose Canseco.63 In 1995, San Diego
Padres GM Randy Smith told the Los Angeles Times that steroid use was
becoming more prevalent, estimating the number of MLB players using
steroids at ten to twenty percent. 64 The 1996 season marked the beginning
of the home run surge.65 Mark McGwire told the Denver Post, "Let's
accept [the increase in home runs] .... It's good for the game." 66
56. Congress Won 't Charge Palmeiro with Perjury, supra note 54.
57. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
58. See supra Part I.A; supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text. But see infra note 386
(presenting evidence that the new policy was in fact working).
59. See Steroid Penalties Much Tougher with Agreement, supra note 4. While other
professional sport leagues such as the NFL have already adopted stronger policies, the new
MLB testing program is now the most stringent of the four major sports. For example, the
penalty for the first offense is a ten-game suspension in the NBA and a twenty-game
suspension in the NHL. Id. For the penalty structure, see MLBPA/MLB Press Release,
supra note 5.
60. See infra notes 61-80 and accompanying text.
61. Jose Canseco admits that he started using steroids in 1984. Jose Canseco, Juiced 11
(2005).
62. Memorandum from Baseball Commissioner Fay Vincent to All Major League Clubs
(June 7, 1991), available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/fornat/memos20051109?memo = 1991 &num= 1. The
memo did include treatment and penalties. Id. However, Commissioner Fay Vincent
conceded that he did not attempt to enforce the drug rules advanced in the memo. See Tom
Farrey, The Memos: A Ban Ignored, ESPN.com, Nov. 9, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/story?page=steroidsExc&num=1 9.
63. See Farrey, supra note 62.
64. See Assael & Keating, supra note 51, at 78.
65. That year the Baltimore Orioles, Seattle Mariners, and Oakland Athletics all broke
the single season team home run record. See id.
66. Id.
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It appears MLB adhered to this approach by ignoring the growing steroid
problem. 67 MLB and the MLBPA reached a new CBA on November 26,
1996, which did not include steroid testing.68  On May 15, 1997,
Commissioner Bud Selig sent a memo similar to the one sent in 1991 by
then-Commissioner Fay Vincent to all the Major League teams detailing
MLB's drug policy.69 The following year, baseball finally recovered from
the labor dispute of 1994-1995 that caused the cancellation of the World
Series in 1994.70 The catalyst for the economic recovery was the home run,
and the showdown between Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire to set the
single-season home run record provided MLB with a substantial economic
incentive to back off pursuing a stricter steroid testing program.71
It took until 2002 for the CBA to include a steroid testing provision. 72
The testing for the 2003 season was to be random (only once for the season
per player), and anonymous. 73 If more than five percent of MLB players
tested positive for steroids, then beginning in 2004 players would be subject
to two random tests, with penalties for positive tests.74 According to
Donald Fehr, the Executive Director of the MLBPA, about five to seven
percent (around eighty) of MLB players tested positive for steroids in 2003,
thus invoking non-anonymous random testing with weak penalties for the
2004 season. 75
67. See generally id.
68. William B. Gould IV, Labor Issues in Professional Sports: Reflections on Baseball,
Labor, and Antitrust Law, 15 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 61, 77 (2004); see also Assael &
Keating, supra note 51, at 78. It appears the inclusion of a steroid testing provision was
never seriously negotiated and that the MLBPA refused to allow it. See Farrey, supra note
62.
69. Memorandum from Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig to All Major League Clubs
(May 15, 1997), available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/format/memos20051109?memo = 1997&num= 1. "The
union didn't even think the policy applied to its members because it wasn't collectively
bargained." See Assael & Keating, supra note 51, at 79.
70. The 1994-1995 strike had economically devastated MLB. See generally Gould,
supra note 68.
71. See Farrey, supra note 62; Peter Gammons, Lawyers, Drugs and Money, ESPN.com,
Dec. 4. 2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/gammons/story?id=1938586. CNNSI.com still
maintains the website for the historic home run battle between Sosa and McGwire. CNNSI,
Target: 61, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/mlb/1998/target61/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2006).
72. See 2003-2006 Basic Agreement (Sep. 30, 2002), available at
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba-english.pdf, see also Assael & Keating, supra note
51, at 79.
73. 2003-2006 Basic Agreement, supra note 72.
74. Id.
75. Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 18 (statement of Donald M. Fehr, Executive
Director, MLBPA). The penalties that were implemented in 2004 were as follows: First
positive test-treatment plan; second positive test-fifteen-day suspension; third positive
test-twenty-five-day suspension; fourth positive test-fifty-day suspension; fifth positive
test-one year suspension. Id. The weakness of this penalty structure is striking when
compared with Olympic-type penalties included in some of the proposed legislation that




This is where MLB's steroid testing stood until congressional
intervention. A substantial amount of the evidence concerning MLB's
failure to address the problem of steroids came directly from the
congressional inquiry into MLB's steroid testing policy highlighted by the
televised congressional committee hearings.76 The hearings have revealed
the substantial deficiency of MLB's testing program; 77 they have prompted
MLB and Commissioner Bud Selig to pursue a more stringent steroid
policy, to the displeasure of the MLBPA.78 In fact, the new steroid policy
is similar to the one eventually proposed by Commissioner Bud Selig. 79
MLB and the MLBPA had already amended the CBA once to strengthen
the steroid testing provisions and punishments before finally agreeing to the
much stricter policy on November 15, 2005.80
76. This was precipitated by President Bush's State of the Union Address. See State of
Union, supra note 1.
77. For example, it took MLB until 2002 to first ban steroids, twenty-seven years after
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) did. World Anti-Doping Agency, A Brief
History of Anti-Doping, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=312
(last visited Oct. 17, 2006). MLB and the MLBPA responded by modifying the steroid
testing provisions of the negotiated collective bargaining agreement (CBA). There have
been many critics of the congressional intervention into baseball's steroids epidemic. Most
of these criticisms focus on the fact that people believe there are more important matters on
which Congress should focus its resources. There have not been many substantive legal
arguments made that would prevent Congress from mandating that MLB and the MLBPA
amend the collective bargaining agreement with regard to steroids. This is mainly because
the players cannot fight the implementation of a stronger steroid policy without further
tarnishing their image and also because very few persuasive legal arguments exist that would
call into question congressional involvement, let alone prevent congressional involvement.
For example, one could argue that congressional intervention in a collective bargaining
agreement is treating athletes as a special class thus violating their equal protection rights;
however, this argument would fail under a rational basis analysis which would be the
necessary level of review. See Brady, Patrick & Stone, supra note 43.
78. Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 19 (statement of Donald M. Fehr, Executive
Director, MLBPA) ("A few weeks after the [MLB House] hearing, despite his previous
emphatic support of the new program, Commissioner Selig publicly called for us to
renegotiate yet again."). For the details of the first changes to the steroid testing provisions
of the CBA, see infra note 80.
79. Commissioner Selig's testing policy was titled the "3 strike policy": fifty game
suspension for the first offense, one hundred games for the second, and a lifetime ban for the
third. The newly amended performance-enhancing drug provisions can hopefully eradicate
the numerous problems of the first amended provisions. See, e.g., Assael & Keating, supra
note 51, at 84 (according to Victor Conte, the man at the center of the BALCO case, under
the first amended provision "it [was] still remarkably easy for players to cheat").
80. For the details of the new agreement, see MLBPAiMLB Press Release, supra note 5.
Before the Senate, Donald Fehr discussed the changes that had already been made to the
2003-2006 Basic Agreement before the new agreement: "(1) [W]e added additional tests,
and established a program under which a player could never be certain that he would not be
tested again; (2) we added off-season testing; and (3) we increased the penalties, including
the public identification and suspension of a player who tested positive for the first time."
Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 19 (statement of Donald M. Fehr, Executive Director,
MLBPA). The suspensions were increased to ten days for the first offense, thirty days for
the second, sixty days for the third, one year for the fourth, and the commissioner can give a
lifetime ban after the fifth. Steroid Penalties Much Tougher with Agreement, supra note 4.
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Thus, congressional intervention has been a success in terms of exposing
the problem and forcing MLB and the MLBPA to deal with the problem by
adopting more stringent testing standards and penalties. 81 This result was
not easily reached. According to Representative Tom Davis, "[i]t's been a
long, not exactly smooth, ride."8 2 Despite the overwhelming success of the
congressional intervention, the question remains whether the proposed
legislation, if it had been enacted or at some point might still be enacted, is
in fact constitutional. Donald Fehr stated that a federally mandated drug
testing program for professional athletes might not be constitutional.8 3 The
following section explains the proposed forms of steroid legislation that
will be examined under the five cases outlined in Part I.D.2.
B. The Proposed Legislation
As of November 1, 2005, five different bills, which all mandate
suspicionless, random drug testing for steroids and other performance-
enhancing drugs, were residing in various stages.84 This section will layout
each bill's key features, while focusing on IPSA because it was closest to
adoption at the time of the agreement between MLB and the MLBPA. 85
1. Integrity in Professional Sports Act
The purpose of IPSA is "[t]o protect the health and safety of all athletes,
to promote the integrity of professional sports by establishing minimum
standards for the testing of steroids and other performance-enhancing
substances and methods by professional sports leagues, and for other
purposes. '86 The bill dictates the testing procedures for the professional
8 1. See supra note 16.
82. Costello & Vacarro, supra note 8, at 76. It appears the looming threat of legislation
being passed as early as November 22, 2005, made the MLBPA give in to the demands of
MLB and Congress. See Steroid Penalties Much Tougher with Agreement, supra note 4;
With No Action by Baseball, Steroids Bill Re-Introduced, supra note 18; cf Senate Hearing,
supra note 11, at 2 (statement of Sen. John McCain) (highlighting that the inevitable
enactment of legislation was necessary to compel the MLBPA to amend further the
collective bargaining agreement). Senator McCain had stated before the Palmeiro
revelation,
It is shameful that professional sports cannot on their own and without external
pressure write and enforce policies that are beyond reproach. Though all four
leagues testifying today have recently taken steps-some bigger than others-to
improve their programs in recent months, many aspects of their policies still need
improvement.
Id. (referring to MLB's inability to effectively agree on a new steroid policy).
83. Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 21-22 (statement of Donald M. Fehr, Executive
Director, MLBPA).
84. See Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005); Professional
Sports Responsibility Act of 2005, H.R. 3942, 109th Cong. (2005); Drug-Free Sports Act,
H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. (2005); Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. (2005);
Clean Sports Act, H.R. 2565, 109th Cong. (2005).
85. With No Action by Baseball, Steroids Bill Re-Introduced, supra note 18.
86. S. 1960. The bill will apply to MLB, Minor League Baseball, the NFL, the NBA,
and the NIL.
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sports leagues.8 7 There will be no notice for the tests, i.e., suspicionless
drug testing. 88 The frequency of the testing will be not fewer than five
times-with at least three tests during the "professional sports season"89
and at least two tests in the "off-season." 90 "The methods, policies and
procedures" 91 of administration and analysis will be determined by an
"independent entity."'92 The analysis will be conducted in a laboratory
approved by the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency and located within the United
States.93 The penalties for positive tests increase with repeated offenses;
players will receive a half-season suspension for a first offense, a full
season suspension for a second offense, and lifetime ban for a third
offense. 94
The bill also sets up an enforcement mechanism if the professional sports
league does not comply. 95 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) polices
violations of IPSA as unfair or deceptive acts or practices under 15 U.S.C. §
41.96 The FTC may seek civil penalties not to exceed $1 million for every
day the league is not in compliance, and the FTC may delegate enforcement
of this Act to any agency of the U.S. Government. 97
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this Note, the authors of
IPSA clarified the constitutional reach of the Act in section 9(a), which
reads, "Non-Governmental Entities-Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to deem the United States Anti-Doping Agency, any independent entity, or
any professional sports league an agent of or an actor on behalf of the
United States Government. 98
87. Id. § 6(c).
88. Id. § 6(c)(1)(B).
89. Id. § 4(8).
90. Id. § 6(c)(1). "The term 'off-season' for each professional athlete means the period
of time outside the professional sports season for that athlete." Id. § 4(4).
91. Id. § 6(c)(2)(A).
92. IPSA defines an independent entity as
(A) a not-for-profit organization-
(i) that conducts sport drug testing and adjudication;
(ii) that does not have a single professional sports league as its primary source
of revenue; and
(iii) whose board of directors and employees are not selected by a
professional sports league or any person affiliated with the professional sports
league; or
(B) the United States Anti-Doping Agency.
Id. § 4(3).
93. Id. § 6(c)(2)(C).
94. Compare Penalties Decreased to Get Support for Steroids Bill, ESPN.com, Nov. 8,
2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=2217767 (explaining that IPSA moved
away from the more stringent "Olympic model"-a two year suspension for the first offense
and a lifetime ban for the second), with S. 1960 § 6(d)(1) (detailing the original penalty
structure of IPSA which adhered to the "Olympic model").
95. S. 1960 § 7.
96. Id. § 7(a).
97. Id. § 7(b).
98. Id. § 9(a).
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2. Clean Sports Act and Drug-Free Sports Act
There are many similarities between the Clean Sports Act (CSA), 99
introduced by the House Committee on Government Reform, and the Drug-
Free Sports Act (DFSA), introduced by the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce.10 0  Both bills establish drug testing standards for
professional sports that follow the "Olympic Model" with respect to what
are deemed banned substances and the applicable penalties for a positive
test.10 1 The penalties are a two-year suspension for the first violation and a
lifetime ban for the second.10 2
There are several differences between the bills. The purpose of the CSA
is "to protect the integrity of professional sports and the health and safety of
athletes generally."' 1 3  The CSA is under the watch of The Office of
National Drug Control Policy Director (the Drug Czar). 10 4 The "major
professional sports leagues"' 1 5 must implement testing policies and
procedures "which shall be independently administered and shall be
consistent with and as stringent as the doping control standard established
by the United States Anti-Doping Agency."' 106 At a minimum, the CSA
requires at least three suspicionless, random tests during the season of play,
and at least two during the off-season for a total of five tests.10 7 The
penalties for noncompliance with the CSA by a major professional sports
league are enforced by the FTC. 108
In contrast, the purpose behind the DFSA is not explicitly stated. The
Secretary of Commerce has the power to issue regulations that the
"professional sports associations"' 09 are required to follow. 110 Similar to
the CSA, the DFSA requires a minimum of five suspicionless, random tests
"each year that such athlete is participating in the activities organized by the
professional sports association."' 1" This includes the "season of play" and
99. There is a Senate companion bill to the Clean Sports Act. See Clean Sports Act of
2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. (2005).
100. H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, Bill Comparison: The Clean Sports Act [H.R. 2565]
and the Drug-Free Sports Act [H.R. 1862] (May 26, 2005), available at
http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20050526103452-64714.pdf.
101. Id.
102. Drug-Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. (2005); Clean Sports Act, H.R. 2565,
109th Cong. (2005).
103. H.R. 2565 § 722(b).
104. Id. § 723(3).
105. According to the Bill, the major professional sports leagues are MLB, the NBA, the
NFL, and the NHL. Id. § 723(4).
106. Id. § 724(b).
107. Id. § 724(b)(1); H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, supra note 100.
108. H.R. 2565 § 726.
109. According to the Bill, the major professional sports leagues are MLB, the NBA, the
NFL, the NHL, Major League Soccer (MLS), and the Arena Football League. See Drug-Free
Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. (2005).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 3(a)(1).
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the "off-season." 112 The penalties for noncompliance with the DFSA by a
professional sports association are enforced by the Secretary of
Commerce. 113
3. Professional Sports and Responsibility Act of 2005
Introduced by the House Judiciary Committee, the Professional Sports
and Responsibility Act of 2005 (PSRA) directs the Justice Department to
establish a Federal Office of Steroids Testing Enforcement and
Prevention. 14 The purpose behind the PSRA is not explicitly stated. The
PSRA requires all "major professional leagues" to adopt the standard and
procedures for the suspicionless, random testing for performance-enhancing
and other controlled substances and the penalty structure for a positive test
as determined by the Attorney General.1 5 The penalties for noncompliance
with the PSRA by a major professional league are administered by the
Attorney General. 116
C. Does the Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable Searches
Apply to a Federal Statute Mandating Drug Testing of MLB Players?
"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects '[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures."' 1 17 While the proposed bills
do not state the method of testing-i.e., blood or urine testing-up to this
point baseball has only employed urine testing for steroids.1 8 The U.S.
Supreme Court has deemed that both urine tests and blood tests constitute
searches under the Fourth Amendment."19
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, the Supreme Court
provided the framework for determining whether the Fourth Amendment
should be applied to suspicionless drug testing by a private employer. 120
112. Id.
113. Id. §4.
114. Professional Sports Responsibility Act of 2005, H.R. 3942, 109th Cong. (2005); see
also Another Steroid Bill Proposed in U.S. House, Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 2005, at E2.
115. H.R. 3942 § 4(a).
116. Id.§6.
117. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV)
(alteration in original).
118. Currently there is no urine test for the banned substance HGH, which was one of the
performance-enhancing drugs used by Jason Giambi. Assael & Keating, supra note 51, at
83-84; Cathy Kristiansen, Detecting Illegal Steroids in Star Athletes, Endocrine News, Mar.
2006, at 12; see also supra note 55. However, Robert Manfred, Jr., Executive Vice
President of MLB, stated before the House of Representatives that "[clontrary to published
reports, there is not an available, verified test for HGH, even with a blood sample." MLB
House Hearing, supra note 3, at 296 (statement of Robert D. Manfred, Jr., Executive Vice
President of MLB).
119. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989).
120. Id. at 614-15; see Sam Kamin, The Private Is Public: The Relevance of Private
Actors in Defining the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. Rev 83, 85 (2004) ("[A]s it is
currently interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment's coverage depends
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Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy stated, "Whether a
private party should be deemed an agent or instrument of the Government
for Fourth Amendment purposes necessarily turns on the degree of the
Government's participation in the private party's activities, a question that
can only be resolved 'in light of all the circumstances."' 121 The Court
essentially applied a "state action" test, 122 which considers "the degree of
the Government's participation in the private party's activities." 1
23
In Skinner, a federal statute authorized the Secretary of Transportation to
regulate railroad employees. 124  As a result, the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) imposed regulations that authorized (but did not
require) railroads to administer various suspicionless tests (blood, breath,
and urine) for drugs and alcohol 125 The Court added that
[t]he fact that the Government has not compelled a private party to
perform a search does not, by itself, establish that the search is a private
one. Here, specific features of the regulations combine to convince us
that the Government did more than adopt a passive position toward the
underlying private conduct. 126
The Court further commented on particular features of government action
that helped it to find "that the Government did more than adopt a passive
position toward the underlying private conduct." 127 These features include
when "[t]he regulations . . . pre-empt state laws, rules, or regulations
covering the same subject matter, and are intended to supersede any
provision of a collective bargaining agreement, or arbitration award
construing such an agreement.' 28
crucially on the scope of private actors' conduct."); Richard L. Stone & Michael A. Perino,
Not Just a Private Club: Self Regulatory Organizations as State Actors When Enforcing
Federal Law, 1995 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 453, 472-73 (explaining the application of the test
for state action that would then implicate the Fourth Amendment in Skinner); see also 5
Employment Coordinator § 30:65 (2004) ("While Skinner arose in the context of a particular
set of regulations concerning substance abuse testing by a railroad employer, it is reasonable
to conclude that it is equally applicable ... to any private employer who may in the future be
required to conduct substance abuse testing under any federal statute or regulation." (citation
omitted)).
121. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487
(1971)).
122. See Stone & Perino, supra note 120, at 472-73; see also David A. Koplow, Back to
the Future and Up to the Sky: Legal Implications of "Open Skies" Inspection for Arms
Control, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 421, 453-54 (1991). State action is determined on a case-by-case
basis. Stone & Perino, supra note 120, at 465-66.
123. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.
124. 45 U.S.C. § 43 1(a) (repealed 1994).
125. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606; see Stone & Perino, supra note 120, at 472 ("The Supreme
Court found coercion sufficient for state action to exist in Skinner v. Railway Executives'
Ass 'n .... involv[ing] the State ordering [a] private actor[] to perform specified functions.").
126. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615.
127. Id.
128. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court continued,
The Government has removed all legal barriers to the testing authorized by
Subpart D [Authorization to Test for Cause] and indeed has made plain not only its
strong preference for testing, but also its desire to share the fruits of such
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Therefore, the Supreme Court added some specific factors to the state
action test. When these factors are present, they point more definitively to a
sufficient degree of state action to implicate the Fourth Amendment. 129
An example of the application of the state action test is the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit case Dimeo v. Griffin,130 which directly
addresses suspicionless drug testing in professional sports. In Dimeo, the
Seventh Circuit applied the Fourth Amendment to determine the
constitutionality of an Illinois Racing Board regulation mandating
suspicionless drug testing of jockeys and other racing participants. 13 1 The
court noted that horse racing is a "heavily regulated activity"'132 and
therefore did not address the question of whether the Fourth Amendment
applied, proceeding on the basis that it was applicable. 133 The Seventh
Circuit proceeded on this basis because of the explicit degree of
government participation in the private entity.134 The court did state that
the owners of the race tracks as private entities could have implemented
suspicionless drug testing "without coming within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment."135
The next section outlines the framework for determining whether the
proposed legislation violates the Fourth Amendment, assuming first that it
is indeed applicable.
intrusions. In addition, it has mandated that the railroads not bargain away the
authority to perform tests granted by Subpart D. These are clear indices of the
Government's encouragement, endorsement, and participation, and suffice to
implicate the Fourth Amendment.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615-16 (emphasis added). Sharing in the fruits essentially means
"encouragement, endorsement and participation in the private activity." Stone & Perino,
supra note 120, at 473. The fact that the government had access to the samples was a factor
in the Court's determination that the government wanted to share in the fruits. Skinner, 489
U.S. at 614-16. In addition, it may have a more specific meaning in the criminal context. See
Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 329, 391 (2002) (indicating that the fruit
of the search is the evidence).
129. There is also the question of whether MLB players who are not American citizens
are entitled to Fourth Amendment protection which is beyond the scope of this Note. For
further discussion, see generally Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of
Law, 26 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 235 (2006).
130. 943 F.2d 679, 680-83 (1991).
131. Id. at 680-85.
132. Id. at 681.
133. Id. at 680-85; see Kamin, supra note 120, at 85 n.9 (explaining that the scope of the
state actor's involvement determines whether there is sufficient state action to implicate the
Fourth Amendment); Stone & Perino, supra note 120, at 464 ("In many cases, courts do not
explicitly analyze the issue [like in Dimeo] because state action is clear."). For an example
of a more recent state court case applying this reasoning, see the Colorado Court of Appeals
case Timm v. Reitz, 39 P.3d 1252, 1254 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). In Timm, the defendant did
not assert that the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to the state regulation mandating the
suspicionless drug testing of licensed greyhound dog racing trainers. Id. at 1254. The court
simply proceeded on the basis that the Fourth Amendment was applicable. Id. at 1254-56.
134. See Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 681-83.
135. Id. at 683.
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D. Application of the Fourth Amendment to the Proposed Legislation
If the Fourth Amendment is found to apply to the proposed federal
steroid legislation, the question becomes whether the bills are
constitutional. A urine test, as mandated by the legislation, is deemed a
search under the Fourth Amendment. 136  The central question to
determining the constitutionality of a search is whether it is reasonable
because "'reasonableness ... is the touchstone of the constitutionality of a
governmental search." '" 37
1. Is the Search Reasonable: The Balancing Test
There are five Supreme Court cases, Skinner, National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab,13 8 Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 139
Chandler v. Miller,140 and Board of Education v. Earls,14 1 analyzed in
detail below, that have built on one another to provide the framework to
determine what, in fact, is a reasonable suspicionless search in the drug
testing context. 142  Generally, under "limited circumstances,' 143 searches
that are exceptions to the rule requiring individualized suspicion "are
sometimes warranted based on 'special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement. '""44
Therefore, a balancing test is used to determine if a "special needs"
exception is warranted. The Supreme Court has extensively explained the
balancing test. If Congress can show "special needs," which indicate a
legitimate or compelling governmental interest, then a court must balance
the promotion of the legitimate governmental interest (or "special needs")
against the intrusion of Fourth Amendment rights. 14 5 In other words, "[i]n
limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search
are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the
intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such
136. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989).
137. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002); see Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305, 313 (1997).
138. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
139. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
140. 520 U.S. 305.
141. 536 U.S. 822.
142. The "special needs" analysis built on Skinner and Von Raab. See Joy L. Ames,
Chandler v. Miller: Redefining "Special Needs "for Suspicionless Drug Testing Under the
Fourth Amendment, 31 Akron L. Rev. 273, 288 (1997).
143. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 308.
144. Id. at 313 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619
(1989)).
145. Earls., 536 U.S. at 829-30; see also C. Ashley Royal, Special Contribution:
Expanding the Scope of Suspicionless Drug Testing in Public Schools, 54 Mercer L. Rev.
1293, 1301 (2003) ("In finding the policy constitutional, the Court conducted a fact-specific
balancing of the intrusion on students' rights versus the promotion of legitimate government




suspicion."' 46 Further, the "precedents establish that the proffered special
need for drug testing must be substantial-important enough to override the
individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the
Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion."' 147
The first step is to determine the significance of the invasion, a two-part
inquiry: the nature or character of the intrusion-here, the urine test-and
the individual's expectation of privacy. 148 Second, if the invasion of the
privacy is deemed not significant, the invasion is then balanced against the
government's special need or needs. 14 9  The Government's proffered
special need must be a "compelling,"150 "substantial," 15 1 or "legitimate"
governmental interest. 152 Further, to prove that special needs do exist, the
Government must also show "the nature and immediacy of [their] concerns
and the efficacy of the [regulation] in meeting them."153
When the nature of the invasion is deemed noninvasive and the
individual's expectation of privacy is diminished, 154 "if the 'special needs'
showing is made, the State [cannot] be faulted for excessive intrusion."'155
Although "[u]rination is 'an excretory function traditionally shielded by
great privacy," ' 156 the "'degree of intrusion' on one's privacy caused by
collecting a urine sample 'depends upon the manner in which production of
the urine sample is monitored."'' 57  In Skinner, Von Raab, Vernonia,
Chandler, and Earls, the urine tests were deemed to be "minimal,"'1 58
"negligible," 159 "noninvasive,"' 160 or "minimally intrusive." 16 1
146. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624).
147. Id. at 318. Courts must examine "the competing private and public interests
advanced by the parties." Id. at 314. Summarizing these balancing tests, the Sixth Circuit
stated, "In reviewing the reasonableness of a drug testing policy, the Court has instructed
that we weigh the extent of the intrusion upon the privacy interest of the individuals being
tested against the promotion of the government's proffered special need in conducting the
tests." Int'l Union v. Winters, 385 F.3d 1003, 1007 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Earls, 536 U.S. at
830).
148. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
149. Id. at 830.
150. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989); Skinner,
489 U.S. at 628.
151. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
152. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829
153. Id. at 834; see also Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319-20. But see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634-
35 (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting the part of the Court's opinion relying on "a
deterrence rationale").
154. Individuals can be determined to have a diminished expectation of privacy in certain
contexts. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-3 1; Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656-57 (1995); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672, 672 n.2; Skinner, 489
U.S. at 627 (majority opinion).
155. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
156. Earls, 536 U.S. at 832 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626).
157. Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658).
158. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
159. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
160. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
161. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
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Because the constitutionality of the legislation is determined through the
application of a balancing test, the existing Supreme Court precedent is the
guidepost for determining how these interests should be balanced. 162 The
following section discusses in detail the five key Supreme Court cases on
suspicionless drug testing.
2. The Five Cases
The Supreme Court has applied the "special needs" test to regulations
mandating suspicionless drug testing of public school students and both
public and private employees (or potential employees).
a. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association
As discussed in Part I.C, Skinner involved the suspicionless drug testing
of private railroad employees. 163 The Court applied the special needs
balancing test to find the regulation constitutional. 164 The compelling
government interest supporting the finding of special needs was balanced
against the diminished expectation of privacy of railroad workers due to
"their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure
safety"' 165 and the "minimal" intrusiveness of the regulation. 166
The compelling government interest was to ensure "the safety of the
traveling public and of the employees themselves."' 67 The evidence and
history of the immediate danger and existing drug problem that led to the
enactment of the federal regulation was substantial. 168 The suspicionless
component was necessary under these facts because "'surpassing safety
interests' ... warranted the FRA testing program. The drug tests could
deter illegal drug use by railroad employees, workers positioned to 'cause
great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to
supervisors."' 169  Thus, the regulation was an effective means of
accomplishing the compelling government interest. 170 The compelling
government interest outweighs the "limited threats to the [railway workers']
justifiable expectations of privacy."'171
162. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 317-18; Int'l Union v. Winters, 385 F.3d 1003, 1008 (6th
Cir. 2004).
163. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
164. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
165. Id. at 627.
166. Id. at 628.
167. Id. at 621.
168. Id. at 608.
169. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 315 (1997) (citations omitted) (quoting Skinner,
489 U.S. at 634, 628).
170. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628-29.
171. Id. at 628.
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b. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
Von Raab focused on suspicionless drug testing of U.S. Customs Service
employees as a condition of promotion or transfer.' 7 2 In May 1986, the
Commissioner of Customs implemented the Drug Testing Policy (DTP).173
The DTP "made drug tests a condition of promotion or transfer to positions
directly involving drug interdiction or requiring the employee to carry a
firearm."174
Justice Kennedy applied the special needs balancing test to these facts. 175
The Court first addressed the "valid public interests" 176 supporting the
special need.' 77 The compelling governmental interest was protecting the
health and safety of the American public by "assuring that employees
placed in these positions would not include drug users." 178  The Court
determined that there was an immediate danger to the public at large and a
potential for "disastrous consequences." 179 However, the "testing scheme
was not implemented in response to any perceived drug problem among
Customs employees, and... the program actually has not led to the
discovery of a significant number of drug users."180
The Court then balanced the compelling government interest ls l against
the Customs employees' diminished expectation of privacy due to the
unique nature of their duties i8 2 and the "significantly minimize[d]"
intrusiveness of the DTP. 183 The Court concluded that the compelling
interests, "safeguarding our borders and the public safety," outweighed the
insufficiently significant privacy interests of the Customs employees.' 8 4 It
172. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1989).
173. Id. at 660.
174. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 315 (discussing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61, 667-77).
175. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671-77.
176. Id. at 67 1.
177. Id. at 668-71.
178. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 316 (discussing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670-71).
179. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. Id. at 673.
181. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 316.
182. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672. The Court explained the diminished expectation of
privacy as follows:
We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the interdiction of
illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in the line of duty likewise have
a diminished expectation of privacy in respect to the intrusions occasioned by a
urine test. Unlike most private citizens or government employees in general,
employees involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect effective inquiry
into their fitness and probity. Much the same is true of employees who are
required to carry firearms. Because successful performance of their duties depends
uniquely on their judgment and dexterity, these employees cannot reasonably
expect to keep from the Service personal information that bears directly on their
fitness.
Id.
183. Id. at 672 n.2.
184. Id. at 677.
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further found the policy to be an effective means of meeting the DTP's
goals. 185
c. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
Vernonia addressed suspicionless drug testing of public school students
engaged in the more limited context of athletic programs (not all
extracurricular activities). 186 In the Fall of 1989, the Vernonia School
District 47J, which operates four schools in Vernonia, Oregon, introduced
the Student Athlete Drug Policy (SADP) which was approved by the
parents and the school board. 187 The SADP requires "random urinalysis
drug testing of students who participate in the District's school athletics
programs."' 88 The Court applied the same special needs balancing test used
in Earls and found the SADP constitutional. 189 Significantly, the Court
stated that "special needs" exist in the public school context before
beginning the balancing analysis.190 First, the Court found the nature of the
students' privacy interest to be diminished because of the public school
environment1 91  and because student athletes "voluntarily subject
themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on
students generally."' 192 Second, the Court found the character of the
intrusion to be "negligible."' 193 Third, combining these two factors, the
Court concluded the "invasion of privacy was not significant."' 94 Lastly,
the Court considered "the nature and immediacy of the governmental
concern at issue ... and the efficacy of this means for meeting it," i.e.,
balancing the government's showing of special needs against the not
significant invasion of privacy. 195 The Court applied the same test in
Earls. 196
The legitimate interest supporting the finding of special needs, as in
Earls, was to deter drug use in order to protect the health and safety of the
students. 197 However, in contrast to Earls, the Vernonia School District
faced "[a]n immediate crisis caused by a sharp increase in drug use in the
school district." 198 The District Court also determined "that student athletes
were not only 'among the drug users,' they were 'leaders of the drug
185. Id. at 676.
186. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995).
187. Id. at 648-50.
188. Id. at 648.
189. Id. at 652-53; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002).
190. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653.
191. Id. at 656-57.
192. Id. at 657.
193. Id. at 658.
194. Id. at 660.
195. Id.
196. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002).
197. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.
198. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 316 (1997) (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663,
648) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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culture."' 199  Further, the SADP is "directed more narrowly" to student
athletes because there is a greater risk of immediate harm to other athletes
and themselves, 200 and because the drug problem in the school was "largely
fueled by the 'role model' effect of athletes' drug use. '201
d. Chandler v. Miller
Chandler involved suspicionless drug testing of political candidates in
the state of Georgia. 20 2 The Court found unconstitutional the Georgia
law 20 3 requiring candidates for specified state offices "to certify that they
have taken a drug test and that the test result was negative." 20 4 It began the
balancing analysis by first addressing the nature of the intrusion, and found
the urine testing method to be "relatively noninvasive." 20 5 Next, while the
Court did not speak explicitly of a diminished expectation of privacy for
political candidates, it can be logically inferred from the language of Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg's opinion (although addressed at a different point)
that political candidates have a diminished expectation of privacy. 206
Therefore, "[b]ecause the State has effectively limited the invasiveness of
the testing procedure, [the Court] concentrated on the core issue: Is the
certification requirement warranted by a special need?" 20 7 The government
interest supporting the proffered special need was the "incompatibility of
unlawful drug use with holding high state office." 208 There was not any
"indication of a concrete danger," nor was the statute enacted "in response
to any fear or suspicion of drug use by state officials. '20 9 Further, the
testing regime was found to be ineffective. 210 Combining these factors, the
Court found the need was "symbolic," not "special," 211 and noted that when
"public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment
precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently
arranged., 2 12
199. Id. at 316 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649)).
200. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662.
201. Id. at 663.
202. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 308.
203. Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-140 (1993).
204. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 308.
205. Id. at 318.
206. See id. at 321.
207. Id. at 318. Because the privacy interest is not significant, a showing of special needs
will shift the balance in favor of the constitutionality of the statute. See id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 319.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 322.
212. Id. at 323.
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e. Board of Education v. Earls
The most recent case on point, Earls, involved suspicionless drug testing
of public school students engaged in extracurricular activities. 213 In the Fall
of 1998, the School District, which administers all Tecumseh, Oklahoma,
public schools, implemented the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy
(SADTP). 214 The SADTP requires all students "to take a drug test before
participating in an extracurricular activity,.., submit to random drug
testing while participating in that activity, and... agree to be tested at any
time upon reasonable suspicion." 215 At the time of the action, the SADTP
had only been applied "to competitive extracurricular activities sanctioned
by the Oklahoma Secondary Schools Activities Association." 2 16
The Court applied the special needs balancing test to these facts and
upheld the SADTP under the Fourth Amendment.217 The Court held the
School District's policy "is a reasonable means of furthering the School
District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among
schoolchildren. ' 218 In applying the balancing test, the Court first addressed
"the nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised by the drug
testing." 219 The Court found that "the students affected by [the SADTP]
have a limited expectation of privacy."220 This conclusion was based on
two factors: first, "[a] student's privacy interest is limited in a public
school environment, ' 221 and second, "students who participate in
competitive extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to
many of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes." 222 The Court
next examined the nature of the intrusion and found the School District's
urine testing procedure to be "minimally intrusive." 223
The Court then balanced the fact that public school students under the
regulation had a diminished expectation of privacy combined with the fact
that the means of testing were minimally intrusive (concluding "the
invasion of students' privacy is not significant") against the Government's
showing of special needs.224 The Court found that special needs existed
213. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826, 830 (2002). Earls extended the Court's
holding in Vernonia to apply to all students participating in extracurricular activities, not just
student athletes. Id. at 838.
214. Id. at 826.
215. Id.
216. Id. The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy (SADTP) has been applied to the
following student activities: "Academic Team, Future Farmers of America, Future
Homemakers of America, band, choir, pom pon [sic], cheerleading, and athletics." Id.
217. See id. at 825. Of course, there is no question that the Fourth Amendment applies to
public school students. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995).
218. Earls, 536 U.S. at 838.
219. Id. at 830.
220. Id. at 832.
221. Id. at 830.
222. Id. at 831.
223. Id. at 834. The Court found the method of testing to be "even less problematic" than
the "negligible intrusion" in Vernonia. Id. at 833 (internal quotation marks omitted).
224. Id. at 834-36.
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and that the SADTP was constitutional. 225  The legitimate interest
supporting the finding of special needs was the School District's need to
prevent, deter, and detect drug use in order to protect the health and safety
of the students. 226 The Court declined "to fashion what would in effect be a
constitutional quantum of drug use necessary to show a 'drug problem."' 2 27
Part II of this Note applies the framework outlined in Part I above to the
proposed legislation.
II. APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The five proposed bills 22 8 compel suspicionless random steroid testing
which would definitively raise Fourth Amendment concerns in the public
sector.229 Generally, but not always, the private sector is free to implement
suspicionless, random drug testing because the Fourth Amendment
precludes only government actions. 230 As outlined in Part I.C, the Supreme
Court has developed a framework to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment applies to the private sector.23 1  Part II.A. 1 presents the
arguments for the applicability of the Fourth Amendment, and Part II.A.2
presents the arguments against the applicability of the Fourth Amendment.
Part II.B assumes the Fourth Amendment is applicable and presents the
arguments for and against whether the search mandated by the proposed
legislation is reasonable.
A. Is the Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable Searches
Applicable to a Search Conducted Pursuant to the Proposed Legislation?
The only Supreme Court case factually based on suspicionless drug
testing in the private sector is Skinner.232 In Skinner, a federal statute
authorized the Secretary of Transportation to regulate railroad
employees. 233 The Secretary of Transportation then delegated the power to
the FRA to impose the drug testing regulations.234 Essentially, the Court in
225. Id.
226. Id. at 837.
227. Id. at 836. The Court accepted the finding of the District Court that "the School
District was faced with a 'drug problem' when it adopted the Policy." Id. at 835.
228. See supra Part I.B.
229. See generally Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
230. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989); see also 5
Employment Coordinator, supra note 120 ("Although the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply to a private party acting on its
own initiative, the protection does apply to a private person's search if the government is a
participant in the activity to a significant degree.").
231. See supra Part I.C.
232. The Seventh Circuit found that the Fourth Amendment applied in determining that a
state regulation by the Illinois Racing Board mandating suspicionless drug testing for
jockeys and other participants in horse racing in Illinois was constitutional. See Dimeo v.
Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 680-81, 685 (7th Cir. 1991).




Skinner applied a state action test to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment was applicable to the regulation. 235 Thus, to argue either side
of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment, Skinner (which looked at the
degree of state action implicated) is the relevant precedent. 236
1. The Fourth Amendment Is Applicable to the Search
The first step is to compare IPSA specifically to the statute in Skinner to
determine the relative degree of state action.237 Under IPSA, Congress will
delegate the authority to a federal agency to oversee the implementation of
the testing policies, although not the day-to-day administration as was done
in Skinner.238 However, the specific requirements of the drug testing
program, particularly the frequency of testing and the penalties, are
explicitly laid out in the proposed legislation. 239
Further, IPSA delegates the power to penalize noncompliance to a federal
agency, the FTC. 240 Therefore, in terms of the statutory construction and
its delegation of authority, the facts of Skinner are similar to all forms of the
proposed steroid legislation.
Next, analyzing IPSA through the Court's framework in Skinner, many
of the essential factors in the Court's determination that the Fourth
Amendment applied in Skinner exist in the proposed legislation.241 These
factors showed the Court that "the Government did more than adopt a
235. Id. at 614; Stone & Perino, supra note 120, at 472-73.
236. See Stone & Perino, supra note 120, at 465-66, 472-73.
237. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614; Stone & Perino, supra note 120, at 472-73.
238. See Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. § 7 (2005). The other
bills also delegate the power of enforcement to federal agencies or authorities. The range of
state action varies from act to act. The Clean Sports Act is at the lower end of the state
action spectrum. The Act grants the Office of National Drug Control Policy Director (the
Drug Czar) the power to bring additional leagues under the Act, but it does not spell out, like
IPSA does, explicitly the methods, policies, and procedures of the drug testing
administration and analysis. Clean Sports Act, H.R. 2565, 109th Cong. (2005). Instead, the
Professional Sports Leagues are required to consult with the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency to
develop drug testing protocols. Id. The Drug-Free Sports Act involves more state action
than IPSA; it delegates the power to implement the regulations to the Secretary of
Commerce. Drug-Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. (2005). The Professional Sports
Responsibility Act is at the highest end of the state action spectrum by most directly
delegating the power to regulate to the federal government. Professional Sports
Responsibility Act of 2005, H.R. 3942, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill calls for the creation of
a Federal Office of Steroids Testing Enforcement and Prevention with the power to establish
and enforce the standards for testing of performance-enhancing substances in professional
sports. Id. Further, the Attorney General is also granted power under this proposed statute to
bring additional sports leagues under the purview of the statute. Id.
239. See S. 1960.
240. Id. § 7.
241. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615. The factors are when (1) the federal regulations "pre-
empt state laws, rules, or regulations covering the same subject matter, and are intended to
supersede 'any provision of a collective bargaining agreement,"' and (2) the government
"has made plain not only its strong preference for testing, but also its desire to share the
fruits of such intrusions." Id. (quoting 50 Fed. Reg. 31552 (1985)).
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passive position toward the underlying private conduct. '242 As in Skinner,
federally mandated drug testing of professional athletes may preempt state
laws dealing with suspicionless drug testing.243 It may also supersede a
collective bargaining agreement. 244 Additionally, Congress has certainly
"made plain ... its strong preference for testing."245  From President
Bush's State of the Union Address, through the televised hearings, to the
eventual agreement between MLB and the MLBPA, Congress has
steadfastly maintained that stronger steroid testing policies must be
implemented. 246 The actions of Congress exhibit behavior indicating a
desire beyond that of a "strong preference." 247  Senators and
Representatives have been extremely outspoken on eradicating steroid
use.248 Congress has demonstrated its "desire to share the fruits of such
intrusions" 249 by making unlawful the failure of a professional sports league
to operate in almost any manner "without adopting and enforcing a testing
policy that meets or exceeds" the minimum requirements of the act.250 The
penalties for noncompliance by a professional sports league include
prosecution under the Federal Trade Commission Act.25'
IPSA includes the same features present in Skinner that the Court found
to be "clear indices of the Government's encouragement, endorsement, and
participation, and suffice to implicate the Fourth Amendment. '252
2. The Fourth Amendment Is Not Applicable to the Search
IPSA can be distinguished from the statute in Skinner, which the Court
found caused a significant enough degree of state action to implicate the
Fourth Amendment. IPSA authorizes an "independent entity 2 53 to
determine the methods, policies, and procedures of the drug testing
administration and analysis rather than the Secretary of Transportation, a
direct governmental authority, in Skinner.254 The federal authority, the
242. Id.
243. For example, California's constitution ensures the right of privacy. Cal. Const. art. 1,
§ 1.
244. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615. "[D]rug testing is a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining" between MLB and the players' union. MLB House Hearing, supra note 3, at 293
(statement of Robert D. Manfred, Jr., Executive Vice President, Labor and Human
Resources, MLB). This factor is particularly pertinent under the facts surrounding the
proposed legislation because the legislation would accomplish what collective bargaining
under intense pressure from Congress could not.
245. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615.
246. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
247. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615.
248. See, e.g., Bunning Press Release, supra note 16.
249. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615.
250. Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005).
251. Id. §7.
252. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615-16.
253. See supra note 92.
254. S. 1960 §§ 3, 6.
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FTC, only comes into play if the professional sports leagues do not
comply. 255 This scheme indicates a lesser degree of state action.256
IPSA meets two of the three guideposts set forth by the Court in Skinner
for determining when there is a sufficient degree of state action for the
Fourth Amendment to apply.257 The first factor, that the regulation would
preempt state laws, is difficult to assail.258 For example, if a state had
enacted a law preventing suspicionless drug testing, it would be preempted
by IPSA. The second factor, that the regulation "supersede 'any provision
of a collective bargaining agreement"' 259 also cannot be attacked.
Although section 9(c) of IPSA states, "Precedent-Nothing in this Act shall
be construed to have any effect on the collective bargaining obligations of
any employer that is not subject to this Act or on any subject matter that is
outside of the scope of this Act,"'260 the effect of IPSA will be to supersede
the provision of the CBA dealing with drug testing for steroids and other
performance-enhancing drugs.
The first part of the third factor, that Congress has "made plain not only
its strong preference for testing,"'261 has been met.262 However, the second
part, Congress's "desire to share the fruits of such intrusions" 263 may not be
satisfied to the degree that it was in Skinner.264 In Skinner, the Court found
that the government wanted to "share the fruits," 265 in part, because the
statute "confer[red] upon the FRA the right to receive certain biological
samples and test results procured by railroads pursuant to Subpart D.' '266
IPSA does not allow the government any access to the samples; however,
the test results are made public, but only to the extent of indicating that
there has been a positive test.267 No other information is revealed. 268
255. Id. § 7.
256. See Stone & Perino, supra note 120, at 464, 472-75; see also Kamin, supra note 120,
at 85 & n.9. In Skinner, the statute gave the power to implement the regulations to the
Secretary of Transportation, who, in turn, granted the power to a federal agency, the Federal
Railroad Administration. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606.
257. See supra Part I.C.
258. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615. If there were a state law to the contrary, such as if the Act
violated California's state constitutional right of privacy, MLB would be forced to follow the
federal statute; otherwise they would not be in compliance with the statute and would be
subject to penalties.
259. Id. (quoting 50 Fed. Reg. 31552 (1985)).
260. S. 1960 § 9(c).
261. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615.
262. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
263. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615.
264. See id. at 614-16.
265. Id. The Court reached this conclusion even though Subpart D of the Act in Skinner
was "permissive." Id. at 611. This highlights that the test of state action is based on the
application of the statute. See Stone & Perino, supra note 120, at 473.
266. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615.




An argument could be made that section 9(a) prevents the bill from
implicating the Fourth Amendment. 269  Section 9(a) states, "Non-
Governmental Entities-Nothing in this Act shall be construed to deem the
United States Anti-Doping Agency, any independent entity, or any
professional sports league an agent of or an actor on behalf of the United
States Government. '270 However, the state action test is based on "the
degree of the Government's participation in the private party's
activities. '" 271 This language will not decrease the degree of state action.272
B. Application of the Fourth Amendment to the Proposed Legislation: Is
the Legislation Constitutional or Is It an Illegal Search Under the Fourth
Amendment?
Assuming that the Fourth Amendment is applicable, a court must next
determine if the proposed legislation violates the Fourth Amendment. Part
II.B. 1 discusses whether the nature of the privacy interest affected by a
suspicionless drug test is or is not significant. Part II.B.2 presents the
arguments for and against the existence of special needs. Part II.B.2.a
details the arguments that the special needs balancing test has been met and
the proposed legislation is constitutional, and Part II.B.2.b explains the
arguments that the special needs balancing test has not been satisfied and
the proposed legislation is not constitutional.
1. Significance of Invasion of Privacy: The Nature of the Privacy Interest
and the Nature of the Intrusion
The Fourth Amendment only precludes unreasonable searches, and not
all suspicionless testing is unconstitutional. 273  As stated above,
suspicionless testing can be constitutional when the invasion of privacy is
"not significant" 274 and there are "'special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement."'' 275 Specifically, "'in certain limited circumstances,
269. Id. § 9(a).
270. Id.
271. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.
272. Stone & Perino, supra note 120, at 464 ("[Tjhe Court must address whether
governmental authority dominates 'an activity to such an extent that its participants must be
deemed to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to
constitutional constraints."' (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,
620 (1991))). Here, a federal statute is the source of the state action, and "when a federal
agency's action is at issue ... or when a party challenges the constitutionality of a federal or
state statute, state action is obviously present." Id.; ef Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614 (applying the
state action test used in Skinner to the language of IPSA and finding that it does not diminish
the actual "degree of the Government's participation").
273. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997). The Court has stated that
"'reasonableness,' . .. is the touchstone of the constitutionality of a governmental search."
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002); see also Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313
(explaining that the focus is on the question, "Are the searches reasonable?"). Both blood
and urine tests would be subject to the same inquiry. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
274. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
275. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619).
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the Government's need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to
prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion
on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of
individualized suspicion.' 27 6
The first step in this analysis is to determine whether the invasion of
privacy is or is not significant.277 There are two parts to the inquiry: the
nature of the intrusion 278 and the nature of the privacy interest affected. 279
If the determination is made that urine testing is a minimal or noninvasive
intrusion and MLB players are found to have a limited expectation of
privacy, then if the Government can show special needs, the balancing test
will be satisfied, and the legislation will be deemed constitutional. 280
Under the first part of the inquiry, the character of the intrusion under
IPSA, the urine test, is no more invasive than the urine tests in Skinner, Von
Raab, Vernonia, Chandler, and Earls which were deemed to be
"minimal," 281  "negligible," 282  "noninvasive," 283  or "minimally
intrusive." 284 Of the five cases, Chandler featured the least invasive of the
urine tests.28 5 The candidate was permitted to provide the urine specimen
at a state-approved laboratory, or at the candidate's personal physician's
office. 286 The proposed legislation mandates a stricter procedure than the
procedure employed 287 in Chandler.288 This is because baseball players
and athletes in other professional sports covered by the proposed legislation
continually attempt to beat the drug testing programs.289 However, the
276. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829 (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 668 (1989)).
277. Id. at 834.
278. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
279. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-31; Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321; Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656-57 (1995); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672, 672 n.2; Skinner, 489 U.S.
at 627.
280. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-34. Further, the Government must also show "the nature and
immediacy of [their] concerns and the efficacy of the [regulation] in meeting them." Id. at
834.
281. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
282. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
283. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
284. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
285. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 310.
286. See id.
287. The statute was found unconstitutional because it did not meet the "special needs"
test, not because of the urine testing procedure itself. Id. at 323.
288. The Court found that Georgia's testing regime was not an effective means of
deterrence. Id. at 319.
289. For example, BALCO distributed tetrahydrogestrinone (THG), also known as "the
clear," a designer steroid that was undetectable and believed to have been used by several
MLB players including Barry Bonds and Gary Sheffield. See Williams & Fainaru-Wada,
BALCO Defendants, supra note 52; Williams & Fainaru-Wada, Bonds and BALCO Grand
Jury, supra note 52. In professional football, former Minnesota Vikings running back
Onterrio Smith was arrested at an airport with a device used to provide doctored urine
samples called "The Original Whizzinator." Police Find Vikings' Smith with Kit to




stricter procedure of IPSA reflects other somewhat stricter urine testing
procedures found to be constitutional.290
For example, in Skinner, the Court concluded "that the testing procedures
contemplated... pose only limited threats to the justifiable expectations of
privacy of covered employees." 291 The urine specimen is "collected in a
medical environment, by personnel unrelated to the railroad employer, and
is thus not unlike similar procedures encountered often in the context of a
regular physical examination." 292
The testing procedures in Von Raab are also similar. The tests are
administered by an independent contractor as follows:
[T]he employee must produce photographic identification and remove any
outer garments .... The employee may produce the sample behind a
partition, or in the privacy of a bathroom stall if he so chooses. To ensure
against adulteration of the specimen, or substitution of a sample from
another person, a monitor of the same sex as the employee remains close
at hand to listen for the normal sounds of urination. Dye is added to the
toilet water to prevent the employee from using the water to adulterate the
sample.293
Thus, the Supreme Court has predominately found urine testing similar to
the testing that will be mandated by IPSA to be essentially noninvasive. 294
Under the second part of the inquiry, the nature of the privacy interest
affected by IPSA, there are arguments for and against the conclusion that
MLB players have a diminished expectation of privacy. Only one of the
two factors in Earls used to conclude that students who participate in
extracurricular activities have a diminished expectation of privacy are
present under IPSA.295 MLB players are not in the public school context,
which directly limits an individual's expectation of privacy;296 however,
like the students in Earls, MLB players have "voluntarily subject[ed]
themselves to many of the same intrusions on their privacy." 297
290. The constitutional public school urine testing procedures in Earls and Vernonia and
the constitutional employee urine testing procedures in Skinner and Von Raab are stricter or
more invasive than the ones employed in Chandler. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
832-33 (2002); Chandler, 520 U.S. at 310; Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 661 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628
(1989).
291. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
292. Id. at 626-27.
293. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 661.
294. See supra notes 156-61.
295. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830, 832; see supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
296. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
297. Id. at 831. In its conclusion that students affected by the SADTP have a diminished
expectation of privacy, the Court used the analogy first used in Vernonia comparing students
"who voluntarily participate in school athletics" with "adults who choose to participate in a
closely regulated industry." Id. at 832 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
employed the analogy to help reconcile Earls with the more narrow reasoning of Vernonia,
which dealt with student athletes, thus lessening its usefulness in distinguishing the privacy
interests of MLB players. Id. at 831-32. Further, the Court concluded that student athletes
voluntarily subject themselves to intrusions of their privacy. Id. Not only have MLB players
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In Chandler, the Court did not discuss any limited expectation of privacy
for the political candidates. 298 According to the sole dissenting opinion by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the majority found that the individual
expectation of privacy was not an important factor because a candidate for
political office "gives up so much privacy," creating a diminished
expectation of privacy.299 The question here is whether, because of the
analogous relinquishing of privacy by political candidates and MLB
players, 300 and because the MLBPA has already agreed to urine testing
through collective bargaining, the nature of MLB players' privacy interests
would be deemed minimal. If it is found to be minimal, and if the
Government can make the "special needs" showing, the suspicionless drug
testing mandated by IPSA cannot be faulted for "excessive intrusion. '30 1
2. The "Special Needs" Exception
For the proposed legislation to be constitutional, there must exist
"'special needs."' 30 2 The question is whether the Government's interest in
the testing mandated by IPSA rises to this level. 30 3 A "special need" exists
". [i]n limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the
search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered
by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of
individualized suspicion.' ' 304 In these circumstances, "a search may be
reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion."30 5
voluntarily subjected themselves to intrusions of their privacy beyond that of student
athletes, but they have also voluntarily subjected themselves to the very intrusion in
question. See infra note 440-41 and accompanying text. The difference is in the severity of
the penalties and the frequency of the testing.
298. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314-18 (1997) (detailing the limited privacy
interests of the public school students in Vernonia and the railroad workers in Skinner). In
Von Raab, the Court also focused on the "diminished expectation of privacy in respect to the
intrusions occasioned by a urine test" because of the nature of the Customs employees work.
489 U.S. at 672. Customs officials are public employees involved directly with illegal drugs
and are required to carry firearms. Id. In Dimeo, the court found the privacy interests of the
jockeys to be "very limited." Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 1991).
299. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 325-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 318 (majority opinion).
301. Id.; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 829.
302. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 619 (1989)); see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 829.
303. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
304. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624). "[T]he nature and
immediacy of [their] concerns and the efficacy of the [regulation] in meeting them" is are
factors. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
305. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314. The Court further explained that "precedents establish
that the proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial-important enough to
override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the
Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion." Id. at 318. The
Court in Earls narrows the special needs exception to the context of "safety and
administrative regulations." Earls, 536 U.S. at 829; see also Leading Cases-Constitutional
Law-Search and Seizure, supra note 145, at 297 (noting that the majority opinion stressed
the underlying need to protect the health and safety of the students).
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Much will depend on whether MLB players are deemed to have a
diminished or limited expectation of privacy. 30 6 However, a finding that
MLB players do not have a diminished expectation of privacy does not
mean the search is per se unreasonable; it just becomes more difficult to
satisfy the balancing test.30 7 If MLB players are deemed to have a
diminished or limited expectation of privacy30 8 (in combination with the
fact that the method of urine testing is noninvasive), 30 9 a showing of
"special needs" will shift the balance in favor of the constitutionality of the
search. 310 Under this balancing test, there are credible arguments for and
against whether the Government's interests behind the proposed legislation
meet the special needs exception.
a. Special Needs Test Satisfied
To satisfy the "special needs" exception, there must be a "legitimate," 311
"substantial," 312  or "compelling" 313  governmental interest. The
governmental interest in IPSA is "to protect the health and safety of all
athletes and promote the integrity of professional sports." 314 Congress's
findings to support the legitimacy of the purpose315 begin by stating that
"[t]he use of anabolic steroids and other performance-enhancing substances
by children and teenagers is a public health problem of national
significance, ' 316 and that "[e]xperts estimate that over 500,000 teenagers
have used performance-enhancing substances." 317 The bill further states
the congressional finding that professional athletes as role models have a
direct and profound impact on the behavior of the nation's youth.318 The
conclusion that "the actual or alleged use of performance-enhancing
substances by professional athletes results in the increased use of these
substances by children and teenagers" is supported by congressional
306. See supra Part II.B. 1.
307. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
308. MLB players may have a diminished expectation of privacy by analogy to
politicians. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321; see also id. at 325-26 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). MLB players may also have a diminished expectation of privacy by analogy to
jockeys. See Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 1991).
309. See supra Part II.B. 1.
310. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
311. Bd. ofEduc. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002).
312. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
313. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989); Skinner v.
Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989).
314. Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. §2 (b) (2005).
315. This purpose fits within the Court's approach in Earls, which narrows the special
needs exception to the context of "safety and administrative regulations." Earls, 536 U.S. at
829; see also Leading Cases-Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure, supra note 145, at
297 (concluding that the majority opinion in Earls "prominently featured" protecting the
health and safety interests of the children).
316. S. 1960 § 2(a)(1).
317. Id. § 2(a)(2).
318. Id. § 2(a)(4).
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testimony,319 and by surveys and studies. 320 Finally, Congress's findings
indicate that the adoption of IPSA would decrease "the pressure on children
and teenagers to use performance-enhancing substances in order to advance
their athletic careers," 321 and "contribute to the reduction in the use of these
substances by children and teenagers." 322 Bolstering Congress's findings,
the Supreme Court has concluded that "drug abuse is one of the most
serious problems confronting our society today." 323
Because there is not a bright-line rule as to what constitutes a special
need, the best measuring tool for the legitimacy of the interest outlined in
the Act will be the comparison to cases that have employed the special
needs analysis to suspicionless drug testing. 324 While the framework
provided by Earls32 5 is instructive, it can certainly be distinguished because
the testing was conducted by a public institution. 326
Thus, the most applicable precedents supporting the constitutionality of
the proposed legislation are Chandler, Skinner, and Von Raab.327
Beginning with Chandler, the problems with the Georgia statute that led to
the finding of unconstitutionality are not present in IPSA. In Chandler, the
State argued that the governmental interest was the struggle against drug
abuse. 328 However, the Court found that "Georgia asserts no evidence of a
drug problem among the State's elected officials, those officials typically
do not perform high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks .... The need revealed, in
short, is symbolic, not 'special,' as that term draws meaning from our case
law." 329 In contrast, IPSA details Congress's findings replete with actual
evidence that supports a direct connection between the use of steroids and
other performance-enhancing substances by MLB players, with the health
319. The congressional testimony is "by parents of minors who used performance-
enhancing substances, and by medical and health experts." Id. § 2(a)(5).
320. Id. § 2(a)(6).
321. Id. § 2(a)(7).
322. Id. § 2(a)(8). These findings coincide with the findings of the House Committee on
Government Reform. The data presented by the Committee on steroid use shows not only an
increase in usage, but also highlights that the inaccurate, yet pervasive view, is that steroids
are not dangerous. See MLB House Hearing, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Rep. Tom
Davis, Chairman, House Comm. on Government Reform). The numbers for actual usage
show the range to be upwards of six percent. Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 1 (statement
of Sen. Ted Stevens, Chairman S. Comm. on Science, Commerce, and Transportation).
323. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989).
324. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305, 314 (1997).
325. A fact-specific inquiry is required. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
326. See Leading Case-Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure, supra note 145, at 297
(noting that the Court found the school context to be the "most significant element" in
evaluating the constitutionality of the suspicionless drug testing policy). Vernonia can be
distinguished on the same basis, and it is essential to note that in Vernonia the Supreme
Court found that "special needs" exist in the public school context. See supra note 190 and
accompanying text.
327. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314.
328. See id. at 321.
329. Id. at 321-22.
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and safety of the nation's children and the athletes themselves. 330 Further,
the Court in Chandler found "[i]n contrast to the effective testing regimes
upheld in Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia, Georgia's certification
requirement is not well designed to identify candidates who violate antidrug
laws. Nor is the scheme a credible means to deter illicit drug users from
seeking election to state office." 331 This finding was based on the fact that
the test date is known, and therefore the candidate can easily escape
detection. 332 IPSA employs suspicionless testing precisely to thwart any
effort to escape detection. 333
Skinner and Von Raab present an almost undeniable compelling
governmental interest, and the regulations enacted in these cases directly
monitor the compelling interests. While on their face the safety concerns
representing the important governmental interest in Skinner and Von Raab
are more immediate than the safety concerns of the proposed steroid
legislation, there is in fact no requirement of immediacy in the case law. 334
Immediacy simply factors into the balancing test.335 The potential for loss
330. See supra notes 316-22 and accompanying text. The actual use of steroids and other
performance-enhancing drugs by MLB players is what prompted the legislation, not the
reverse. Rather, the motivation behind IPSA would have to be a desire to keep MLB clean
of these substances to fit with the impetus behind the Georgia statute. See Chandler, 520
U.S. at 321 ("The suspicionless tests, according to respondents, signify that candidates, if
elected, will be fit to serve their constituents free from the influence of illegal drugs."). For a
further analysis of the specific data used to support the implementation of IPSA, see infra
notes 355-60 and accompanying text.
331. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319.
332. Id. at 319-20.
333. See generally Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005).
334. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989) ("Employees
subject to the tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a
momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.... [E]mployees who are
subject to testing under the FRA regulations can cause great human loss before any signs of
impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others."); see also Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989) (applying the reasoning in
Skinner, and concluding that Customs officials who carry firearms can produce the same
"disastrous consequences"). Further, with respect to Customs officials,
the almost unique mission of the Service gives the Government a compelling
interest in ensuring that many of these covered employees do not use drugs even
off duty, for such use creates risks of bribery and blackmail against which the
Government is entitled to guard. In light of the extraordinary safety and national
security hazards that would attend the promotion of drug users to positions that
require the carrying of firearms or the interdiction of controlled substances, the
Service's policy of deterring drug users from seeking such promotions cannot be
deemed unreasonable.
Id. at 674. While safety is an essential factor in the special needs analysis, the Court does
not conclude that a showing of "surpassing safety interests," or "extraordinary safety and
national security hazards [are necessary] in order to override the usual protections of the
Fourth Amendment." Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002).
335. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834 (explaining that the "nature and immediacy of the
government's concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in meeting them" are factors in the
balancing test). The Court in Earls also stated that the "Government's need to discover...




of human life was a profound factor in the balancing test analysis in
Skinner336 and Von Raab,337 and it is still present in the threat posed by the
use of steroids and other performance-enhancing substances. 338 In fact,
there is an immediate danger, although probably to a lesser degree, to the
children and teenagers who follow the MLB players' example, and to the
athletes themselves. 339
Statistical evidence of the severity of the problem of steroid use in MLB
does not rise to the level of the statistical evidence supporting the other
situations where the special needs exception has been applied. 340 Yet, in
Von Raab, the petitioners argued that the constitutional "testing scheme was
not implemented in response to any perceived drug problem among
Customs employees, and.., the program actually has not led to the
discovery of a significant number of drug users. ' 341 In fact, slightly more
than one-tenth of one percent (five employees out of 3,600 employees) had
tested positive.342 However, the Court found that in the context of Customs
employees' duties and combined with the fact that "drug abuse is one of the
most serious problems confronting our society today," a documented drug
problem was not a necessary prerequisite for the constitutionality of the
regulation.343
Expanding on these numbers, the Seventh Circuit upheld, under the
Fourth Amendment, an Illinois Racing Board regulation requiring
suspicionless drug testing for jockeys and other participants in horse racing
in Illinois. 344 In Dimeo v. Griffin, the pilot testing program (which may not
be "reliable") showed seventeen percent tested positive.345 The testing in
MLB that led to the threat of legislation showed that in 2003, about five to
seven percent of MLB players (around eighty players) tested positive for
336. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
337. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670.
338. Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, § 2(a)(3) (detailing the dangers of
steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs).
339. See id. § 2(a)(4).
340. See infra notes 354-60 and accompanying text.
341. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 673. This was Justice Antonin Scalia's major concern in his
dissent. Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I decline to join the Court's opinion in the present
case because neither frequency of use or connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely.
In my view the Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation of privacy and human
dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use.").
342. Id. at 673 (majority opinion); see also Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 684 (7th Cir.
1991).
343. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674.
344. Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 680-81, 685; accord Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1141-
43 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding the constitutionality of a New Jersey Racing Commission
regulation requiring suspicionless urine testing of officials, jockeys, trainers, and grooms).
But see Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. State Racing Comm'n, 532 N.E.2d
644 (Mass. 1989) (invalidating a drug testing program for jockeys). However, Horsemen's
Benevolent was based primarily on "the state constitution rather than the Fourth Amendment
and the decision preceded the Supreme Court's drug-testing cases [Skinner and Von Raab]."
Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 684.
345. Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 684.
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steroids.346 The numbers in Dimeo are higher, showing a more pervasive
problem than the one facing MLB; however, the jockey regulation is to
protect the safety of the jockeys and other participants themselves. 347 IPSA
is designed to protect not only the participants, but also the "broader
public." 348  Moreover, the "Court has not required a particularized or
pervasive drug problem before allowing the government to conduct
suspicionless drug testing."349
As will be seen in the following section, these precedents can also
support the other side of the argument; however, there is no specific
language in the decisions that would make the special needs exception
inapplicable to the problem of steroids and other performance-enhancing
drugs in professional sports.350 There is definitely a strong argument under
the "malleable 'special needs' balancing" test that IPSA is constitutional. 351
Therefore, based upon the evidence of the legitimate interest presented by
Congress, a court could conclude that a special needs exception is
warranted under these specific circumstances. 352
b. Special Needs Test Not Satisfied
Under the framework of Earls and Chandler, there may be insufficient
evidence supporting the professed purpose353 to classify IPSA's interest as
a "special need."'354 In Earls, the Court provided the following general data
on drug abuse to highlight the compelling governmental interest: 355 The
number of twelfth graders using illicit drugs grew from 48.4% in 1995 to
53.9% in 2001.356 Marijuana usage increased over the same period from
41.7% to 49%.357 At the same time, while the findings of Congress
highlight that there is a real problem to be remedied, it does not reach the
346. See supra note 75.
347. Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 685.
348. Id.; see Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(8) (2005).
349. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 835 (2002).
350. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
351. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
352. It is important to note that if Congress sought to make the legislation constitutional
by removing suspicionless testing, the legislation would be extremely less effective and
could possibly create new constitutional hurdles. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 837; Skinner, 489
U.S. at 631.
353. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
354. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 835 ("'A demonstrated problem of drug abuse... [is] not in
all cases necessary to the validity of a testing regime,' but ... some showing does 'shore up
an assertion of special need for a suspicionless general search program."' (quoting Chandler
v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997))). In Von Raab, the Court upheld the suspicionless drug
testing program despite any documented drug abuse problem. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 320.
However, the Court stated that Von Raab was "[h]ardly a decision opening broad vistas for
suspicionless searches" and that it "must be read in its unique context." Id. at 321.
355. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834-35.




level of the problem in Earls in terms of hard data.358 For example, a 2003
survey of over 15,000 high school students conducted by the Centers for
Disease Control revealed that greater than six percent of high school
students admitted to using illegal steroids. 359 The other studies presented in
Part L.A also show steroid usage by high school students to be around six to
seven percent. 360
The nature of the privacy interest will not be as diminished as it was
found to be in Earls,361 and the statistical evidence of the steroid problem
does not reach the level of the problem that the regulations attempted to
eradicate in Earls.362 Therefore, the balancing test might not be satisfied-
the nature of the invasion might be more significant, and the interest
supporting the proposed legislation may not rise to the level of a "special
need.'' 363 IPSA must also be analyzed under the precedent of Chandler,
Skinner, and Von Raab.364
In Chandler, the Court stated that "[c]andidates for public office, in
contrast [to the Customs officials in Von Raab], are subject to relentless
scrutiny-by their peers, the public, and the press. Their day-to-day
conduct attracts attention notably beyond the norm in ordinary work
environments." 365 Certainly it can be asserted that MLB players fit into
that classification that creates a diminished expectation of privacy, a
controlled work environment with day-to-day scrutiny. Many MLB players
have been outspoken against the use of steroids, 366 and the public and the
press have been unrelenting once the suspicion of widespread steroid use
became supported by verifiable evidence. 367 There is even already a testing
regime in place. 368 Normally, this diminished expectation of privacy would
reduce the chances of a special needs claim succeeding under the balancing
test; however, as the Court explained in Chandler, the diminished
expectation of privacy creates a deterrent effect in and of itself, making
358. For the findings of Congress, see supra notes 315-22 and accompanying text.
359. Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at I (statement of Sen. Ted Stevens, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Science, Commerce, and Transportation).
360. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
361. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 832.
362. See supra notes 355-60 and accompanying text. But see Earls, 536 U.S. at 850-55
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the testing policy is a "symbolic measure" and not
tailored to address any specific harms associated with the group subjected to the
suspicionless testing).
363. However, a court might conclude that there is a diminished expectation of privacy
for MLB players. See supra notes 295-300 and accompanying text.
364. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997).
365. Id. at 321.
366. For example, Curt Schilling and Frank Thomas, both outspoken opponents of steroid
use, testified before the House Committee on Government Reform. Schilling: Canseco's
Book 'Ruined Some People's Lives,' ESPN.com, Mar. 19, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2017211.
367. See Williams & Fainaru-Wada, Bonds and BALCO Grand Jury, supra note 52.
368. See supra notes 79-80.
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suspicionless testing unnecessary. 369 The Court in Chandler concluded that
the "need revealed, in short, is symbolic, not 'special,' as that term draws
meaning from our case law. '370 In other words, "Georgia asserts no
evidence of a drug problem among the State's elected officials[;] those
officials typically do not perform high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks, and the
required certification [that the candidate has passed a drug test] ... aids no
interdiction effort. ' 37 1 Further, the statute was found to be an ineffective
means of deterring drug abuse. 372
That reasoning could be applied to the problem of steroids and other
performance-enhancing drugs in baseball, particularly with the added
purpose of IPSA to "promote the integrity of professional sports." 373 Factor
in what has been generally perceived as political grandstanding, and it
appears that Congress is attempting to set the right example through
legislation. 374
If the interest behind the bill can be shown to be "symbolic" ' 375 as the
statute was in Chandler, IPSA will not survive Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. 376 "Indeed, if a need of the 'set a good example' genre were
sufficient to overwhelm a Fourth Amendment objection, then the care this
Court took to explain why the needs in Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia
ranked as 'special' wasted many words in entirely unnecessary, perhaps
even misleading elaborations. '377 This language also highlights the need to
look at the special needs exceptions made in these cases, all of which are
369. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, as the sole
dissenter, explained the majority's reasoning: "The Court says, in effect, that the kind of
drug test for candidates required by the Georgia law is unnecessary, because the scrutiny to
which they are already subjected by reason of their candidacy will enable people to detect
any drug use on their part." Id. at 325-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). If an opponent of
IPSA asserts that MLB players have a diminished expectation of privacy along the lines of
politicians, making the enactment of the legislation unnecessary, then the opposing party will
be tied to this conclusion of a diminished expectation of privacy. If the Court then accepts
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent outlined in supra note 299 and accompanying text, the fact
that it has been determined that MLB players have a diminished expectation of privacy will
tilt the balancing test in the government's favor. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying
text (explaining the special needs balancing test).
370. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322. The Court went on to conclude that "[t]he candidate
drug test Georgia has devised diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's sake. The Fourth
Amendment shields society against that state action." Id. However, much of this conclusion
relies on the fact that a governmental employee is being regulated. Id. The Court in
Chandler explicitly does not address drug testing in the private sector, even with state action
sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 323.
371. Id. at 321-22. In fact, there is no evidence of drug abuse by political candidates in
general. A "demonstrated problem of drug abuse" is not a necessary element, but it "would
shore up an assertion of special need[s]." Id. at 319.
372. See id. at 319-20; see also supra notes 331-32 and accompanying text.
373. Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005).
374. See Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 2 (statement of Sen. John McCain).
375. For the factors leading to a finding that the professed need is symbolic, see supra
notes 371-74 and accompanying text.




more pressing than the need to eradicate steroid use in professional sports
where "public safety [may or may] not [be] genuinely in jeopardy. '378
Skinner and Von Raab, as noted above, provide examples of special
needs where public safety is genuinely in jeopardy. 379 The threat of a
railroad employee using drugs and causing a devastating accident, or a
Customs official using drugs and shooting a firearm represent more
immediate harms and therefore would be accorded more weight in the
balancing equation than would the potential for children and teenagers to
use steroids because their role models are using them. 380
In Skinner, the findings of Congress supporting the enactment of the
legislation (and the special need) were based on the fact that alcohol and
drug abuse by railroad employees created a serious threat to the safety of
the general public and the employees themselves. 381 IPSA frames the
findings in terms of "a public health problem of national significance. '382
In Skinner, the evidence and history that led to the enactment of the federal
regulation were far more substantial then the evidence supporting the
findings of Congress that gave rise to IPSA.
[T]he FRA identified 34 fatalities, 66 injuries and over $28 million in
property damage (in 1983 dollars) that resulted from the errors of alcohol
and drug-impaired employees in 45 train accidents and train incidents
during the period 1975 through 1983. Some of these accidents resulted in
the release of hazardous materials and, in one case, the ensuing pollution
required the evacuation of an entire Louisiana community. In view of the
obvious safety hazards of drug and alcohol use by railroad employees, the
FRA announced in June 1984 its intention to promulgate federal
regulations on the subject. 383
The Court further noted that the regulations were an effective means of
deterrence, 384 and the deterrent effect of the statute is a factor in the
balancing equation. 385
The MLBPA has argued that the proposed legislation will not provide
any greater deterrent effect than the steroid testing policy agreed to as part
of the collective bargaining agreement. 386 If the MLBPA's assertion is
true, then IPSA can also be deemed "symbolic" because it will have no
effect on preventing the use of steroids and performance enhancing drugs
378. Id. at 323.
379. Id. at 322-23.
380. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829-30 (2002).
381. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989).
382. Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2005).
383. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
384. Id. at 629.
385. See id. at 618-33; see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319-20 (1997) (finding
the statute an ineffective means of preventing drug abuse).
386. See Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 19 (statement of Donald M. Fehr, Executive
Director, MLBPA) ("The 2005 results demonstrate that the players take our program
seriously."). The data presented by Fehr revealed that, out of more than 1400 tests, there
have been only nine suspensions for positive tests. Id.
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by MLB players 387 and because there is some evidence that IPSA will not
decrease the use of steroids and performance-enhancing drugs by the
broader public.3 88
The "symbolic" nature of IPSA may not fit within the narrow application
of the special needs exception in Von Raab.389 The Court's reading of Von
Raab reinforced the principle-to guard against the intrusion on personal
liberty-behind the Fourth Amendment. 3 90
A Seventh Circuit decision, upholding the regulation requiring
suspicionless drug testing of jockeys and other racing participants, can be
distinguished from the regulation requiring suspicionless drug testing of
MLB players on two grounds.39 1 First, horse racing is a "heavily regulated
activity," 392 because "[i]t is highly dangerous to jockeys ... ; it is a magnet
for gambling; and it has an unsavory, or at least a shadowed, reputation,
growing out of a long history of fixing, cheating, doping of horses, illegal
gambling, and other corrupt practices. ' 393 MLB, while not without its share
of scandals, 394 is not a heavily regulated activity under the Seventh
Circuit's definition in Dimeo.3 95  Second, the findings supporting the
implementation of the regulation in Dimeo are twofold: A concern for the
safety of the jockeys and participants while racing, and a financial
concern. 396 IPSA is based on a more general concern for the safety of MLB
players and the broader public. 397 Specifically, "[h]orse racing is the most
dangerous of the common sports, other than auto racing. An average of 2
387. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319-20; see also supra notes 331-32 and accompanying
text (describing the ineffective Georgia drug-testing statute struck down in Chandler).
Recent evidence shows that the policy that was adopted is ineffective. Brian Costello, MLB
Fails the Test: Steroid Policy Full of Holes, N.Y. Post, Mar. 27, 2006, at 68.
388. See Women & Steroids House Hearing, supra note 41, at 54 (testimony of Diane
Elliot, M.D., Professor of Medicine, Oregon Health & Science University). But see Lawton
Failed Test After Taking Veterinary Steroid, ESPN.com, Dec. 22, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2268670 (highlighting that even MLB players
feel the pressure to take the drugs just to be able to compete). Thus, without a stringent
policy against steroid use at the major league level, young players will use steroids because
that is the only way to compete against other players also using steroids.
389. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 320-21 (discussing Von Raab); supra note 354.
390. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322.
391. See generally Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1991).
392. Id. at 681.
393. Id.
394. The most prominent example is the "Black Sox" scandal of 1919. Eight members of
the Chicago White Sox were accused of conspiring to fix the World Series. See Chi. History
Museum, History Files-Chicago Black Sox,
http://www.chicagohistory.org/history/blacksox.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2006).
395. In fact, MLB has enjoyed great autonomy from regulation. See generally Gould,
supra note 68 (explaining MLB's antitrust exemption).
396. Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 681-82.
397. There have been no reports of steroid use causing any deaths during a baseball game.
However, the performance-enhancing drug ephedrine has contributed to the death of at least
one professional baseball player during spring training practice. See Hal Bodley, Baseball
Must Act Now to Prevent Further Deaths, USA Today, Mar. 13, 2003, at 9C.
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jockeys are killed each year in this country, out of some 2,000, and another
100 are injured seriously enough to be disabled for at least a week. '398
The state's significant financial concern helps in distinguishing Dimeo
from IPSA. Addressing the financial concern, Judge Richard Posner stated,
"Illinois derives tens of millions of dollars in tax revenues annually from
pari-mutuel betting. Those revenues would fall if betting declined as a
result of a belief by the public that the fairness of the races was being
impaired because jockeys and other participants were using drugs." 399
While states do gain substantial revenue through income taxes on
professional athletes and sales taxes on tickets and merchandise, a key
factor in Dimeo, the "unsavory" component of state endorsed gambling, 400
is not as prevalent in MLB or the other major professional sports.
Therefore, IPSA may not survive a Fourth Amendment challenge under
the language of Chandler. The bill cannot be justified under the special
needs exception using Von Raab or Skinner. IPSA can be distinguished on
its facts from the regulation in question in Dimeo.40 1 Therefore, there is no
precedent as of yet supporting the constitutionality of a suspicionless urine
test under the circumstances outlined above and no indication that the Court
is looking to expand the "closely guarded" special needs category. 40 2
The final part of this Note analyzes whether, if enacted, IPSA would
indeed be constitutional.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
On November 15, 2005, the MLBPA succumbed to intense congressional
and public pressure. It agreed to amend the CBA a second time to
implement more stringent steroid policies. 40 3 This happened just a week
before IPSA was scheduled to be voted on,4°4 and this represented a rare
concession by the MLBPA, regarded as the most powerful union in
professional sports. 405
398. Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 683 (citation omitted).
399. Id. at 682. But see id. at 683-84 (explaining that fiscal benefits of the regulation may
be somewhat smaller).
400. Id. at 681.
401. See supra notes 391-99 and accompanying text.
402. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001).
403. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 4-5.
405. See Lee Jenkins, A Chance for Baseball to Settle Its Drug Score, N.Y. Times, Dec.
12, 2004, § 8, at 1 (reporting that the MLBPA, "the most powerful union in professional
sports, had never [before] agreed to reopen a clause [in the collective bargaining
agreement]"). The agreement instead highlights the twofold predicament that the MLBPA
faced. First, to show that the Act is unconstitutional, the MLBPA would have to litigate the
issue. This would compound the damage to the already-tarnished image of MLB players.
See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text. Based on the evidence of steroid use
available to the public, the MLBPA would be seen as trying to protect players' ability to
cheat without being caught and properly punished. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying
text. Second, the agreed-upon testing program is still not as stringent as originally mandated
by IPSA and certainly not as stringent as "Olympic style" testing. See supra note 8 and
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A. The Fourth Amendment Is Applicable to the Suspicionless Drug Testing
Mandated by IPSA
The first step in analyzing the constitutionality of IPSA is to determine
whether the Fourth Amendment applies. 40 6 The Fourth Amendment applies
to IPSA. 40 7 Under Skinner, there is sufficient state action to implicate the
Fourth Amendment. 40 8 Skinner is the lone Supreme Court case to deal with
drug testing in the private sector.4 09 Under Dimeo, there is also sufficient
state action to implicate the Fourth Amendment.4 10
Therefore, the case law shows the Fourth Amendment applies to the
proposed legislation. The viewpoint that the Fourth Amendment would be
applicable to drug testing under IPSA is further supported by scholarly
work discussing the test for when state action is sufficient to invoke the
Fourth Amendment, and by employment law practice guides. 4 11
The Fourth Amendment would also be applicable under the Supreme
Court's factors in Skinner.4 12 Only the second part of the third factor,
Congress's "desire to share the fruits of such intrusions, '4 13 is susceptible to
attack.4 14 Under the regulation in Skinner, the Government can obtain the
samples. 4 15 Despite this one instance of greater state action in Skinner,
there is no requirement that all the factors be met in their entirety. 4 16 These
factors simply aid in determining the degree of state action. 4 17
The plain language of the statute does not rebut a finding of sufficient
state action. Even the language of the statute declaring there is no state
action does not rebut the facial and actual evidence of state action.4 18
The substantial precedent providing the framework for when the Fourth
Amendment will be found to apply, particularly with the precedent of
accompanying text. The extreme nature of "Olympic style" penalties and adjudication was
seen recently with the lifetime ban of former 100-meter world record holder Tim
Montgomery. Alan Abrahamson, Sprinter Says Ban Is End of His Career, L.A. Times, Dec.
15, 2005, at D3. Montgomery was suspended without ever having failed a drug test. Id. He
was banned by the Swiss-based Court of Arbitration for Sport based on his link to BALCO
and the testimony of another sprinter. Id. Perhaps the MLBPA did not want its players to
face the end that Tim Montgomery met. See John Smallwood, Baseball Players Should
Quake at Montgomery's Drug Penalty, Ventura County Star, Dec. 17, 2005, at 2 ("So while
some might look at the MLBPA as having suffered a rare loss by giving in to commissioner
Bud Selig's demands for tougher penalties for steroid use, I think it just saw the bigger
picture.").
406. See supra Part II.A.
407. See supra Parts I.A, II.A.
408. See supra Part II.A. 1.
409. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 120, 235-37.
412. See supra notes 120-29, 241-52 and accompanying text.
413. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615 (1989).
414. See supra notes 263-68 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 120, 235-37.
416. See supra notes 120, 235-37.
417. See supra notes 120, 235-37.
418. See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
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Skinner, proves that the constitutionality of IPSA will be evaluated under
the Fourth Amendment.
B. The Search Is Reasonable
The urine testing under IPSA must be proven reasonable, as
"'reasonableness' 
. . . is the touchstone of the constitutionality of a
governmental search. '419 The first step is to determine the significance of
the invasion.420 When the nature of the intrusion is minimal and athletes
have a diminished expectation of privacy, then if "special needs" exist, the
balancing test is satisfied.421  The legislation will therefore be
constitutional. 422 On the other hand, the combination of a non-diminished
expectation of privacy and facts and evidence that do not meet the level of
the "closely guarded category of special needs" that the court has
established, would seem to fall short in the balancing equation..423
Focusing first on the nature or character of the intrusion, the conclusion
that the urine testing procedures dictated by IPSA are anything more than
"noninvasive," 424 cannot be challenged. In Skinner, Von Raab, Vernonia,
Chandler, and Earls, the procedures for urine testing were all similar, if not
stricter in some cases, than the procedure for urine testing under IPSA. The
Supreme Court found the invasion of privacy in all these cases to be
"minimal,"425 "negligible," 426  "noninvasive," 427  or "minimally
intrusive." 428 In addition, the MLBPA has already agreed to this type of
testing through collective bargaining.
Turning next to the nature of the privacy interest, an MLB player (or
other professional athlete) would be found to have a diminished expectation
of privacy. This conclusion is reached by comparing the privacy interest of
MLB players to the privacy interest of public school students and public
and private employees in cases in which the Court has found minimal or
diminished expectations of privacy. Earls and Vernonia can be
distinguished because the public school context creates a diminished
expectation of privacy. 429 Von Raab can be distinguished because it "must
be read in its unique context. '430 There is a distinct reason behind the
diminished expectation of privacy for Customs employees. 431 Skinner can
419. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002).
420. See supra notes 148, 277-79 and accompanying text.
421. See supra notes 306-10 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 306-10, 351-52 and accompanying text.
423. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001); see supra note 402 and
accompanying text.
424. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).
425. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989).
426. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).
427. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
428. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002).
429. See supra notes 191, 219-22, 296-97 and accompanying text.
430. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321.
431. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 (1989).
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also be distinguished. Railroad employees "'by reason of their participation
in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety,' had diminished
expectations of privacy." 432 Therefore, the Court has delineated specific
conditions that indicate a limited expectation of privacy. The privacy
interest of MLB players does not meet any of these specific conditions for a
diminished expectation of privacy.433
However, the factors that led to the finding of a diminished expectation
of privacy for a political candidate in Chandler are present in the case of a
professional athlete. Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion states,
"Candidates for public office, in contrast [to the Customs officials in Von
Raab], are subject to relentless scrutiny-by their peers, the public, and the
press. Their day-to-day conduct attracts attention notably beyond the norm
in ordinary work environments. '434  MLB players certainly fit that
description. 435 Further, MLB players fit the description of an entity that has
a diminished expectation of privacy according to Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent.436
As evidenced by the unfolding of the steroid scandal, MLB players (and
other professional athletes) are certainly subject to "relentless scrutiny" 437
from all avenues. This scrutiny has extended beyond their "peers, the
public, and the press" 438 to the President and Congress.439 Even the day-to-
day performance of MLB players (and other professional athletes), both on
the field and off the field is monitored. This scrutiny can be unrelenting.440
It was the San Francisco Chronicle that first broke leaked grand jury
432. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 315 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 627 (1989)).
433. MLB players, like political candidates, "do not perform high-risk, safety-sensitive
tasks." See id. at 321-22.
434. Id. at 321; see also id. at 325-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
435. See infra notes 437-41 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 299, 369. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent is more explicit in
attributing a diminished expectation of privacy to political candidates; however, his
explanation of the majority opinion is consistent with the language used by the majority. See
supra notes 299, 369.
437. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321.
438. Id.
439. See supra notes 366-67 and accompanying text.
440. This extends from daily sports talk shows on the radio and television to the print
media. For example, New York Yankees star, and reigning American League Most
Valuable Player, Alex Rodriguez, has been criticized by the media and fans for his actions
both on and off the field. See Gersh Kuntzman & Steve Serby, Fans Blast Bombers-Fiasco
Leads to 'Rod' Rage, N.Y. Post, Oct. 12, 2005, at 4 (detailing fan e-mails blaming Alex
Rodriguez for the Yankees playoff "meltdown"); Michael Morrissey, A-Rod: Poker Not in
Cards, N.Y. Post, Nov. 15, 2005, at 85 (calling Rodriguez's visiting these possibly illegal
poker dens "stupid"); Sound Off: A-Rod Mucks Clean Image, N.Y. Post, Nov. 6, 2005, at 61
(detailing fan e-mails reacting to the news that Alex Rodriguez played poker in possibly
illegal poker clubs in New York City). It even reaches the daily exploits of former players.
For example, former MLB pitcher Jeff Reardon's arrest for robbery was covered almost
immediately by all the major news outlets. See Ex-Pitching Star Jeff Reardon Arrested in
Fla. Robbery, FOXnews.com, Dec. 27, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,179793,00.html.
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testimony from the Bay Area Laboratory Co-operative (BALCO) case.441
It is hard to imagine a better analogy than between political candidates and
professional athletes in terms of the scrutiny each face on a day-to-day
basis. As a result, MLB players will be found to have a diminished
expectation of privacy.
An important case due to the factual similarity of a drug testing
regulation in the sports context, Dimeo, does not alter this conclusion.
442
While some of the facts of Dimeo443 are distinguishable from IPSA, by
analogy, MLB players, like jockeys, have a diminished expectation of
privacy. 444 Like the jockeys, there is danger to the professional baseball
players themselves, but there is also a danger to the broader public which is
supported by Congress's findings. 445 This real and not "symbolic""446
broader public purpose is not present in the case of jockeys. 447
A diminished expectation of privacy may also be stipulated by an
opponent of IPSA in order to have the bill found unconstitutional under part
of the Court's reasoning in Chandler. In his dissent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist found the majority "perversely relies" on the diminished
expectation of privacy
as a reason for sustaining a Fourth Amendment claim. The Court says, in
effect, that the kind of drug test for candidates required by the Georgia
law is unnecessary, because the scrutiny to which they are already
subjected by reason of their candidacy will enable people to detect any
drug use on their part.448
This line of reasoning will fail if applied to IPSA because the very fact that
there is a real steroid problem, unlike in Chandler, makes the statute
necessary because public scrutiny has not stopped people from using
steroids. Rafael Palmeiro is the quintessential example.449
Therefore, MLB players will be found to have a diminished expectation
of privacy because of the relentless day-to-day scrutiny they are subject to,
and because their behavior has a real, profound, and direct effect on the
health and safety of others (or because the diminished expectation of
privacy has been stipulated).
Because the nature of the intrusion will be deemed minimal, and MLB
players will be found to have a diminished expectation of privacy, the
441. See Williams & Fainaru-Wada, Bonds and BALCO Grand Jury, supra note 52.
442. See supra note 391 and accompanying text.
443. For a discussion of the two distinguishing features, the physical danger to the
jockeys themselves and the other participants and the state financial interest, see supra notes
391-400 and accompanying text.
444. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
445. See supra note 348. For the findings of Congress, see supra notes 314-23 and
accompanying text.
446. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997).
447. See Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 1991).
448. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 325-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
449. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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invasion of privacy is not significant.450 Therefore, a showing of special
needs is sufficient to uphold the constitutionality of the Act. 451 An essential
part of the special needs inquiry is "the nature and immediacy of [their]
concern and the efficacy of the [regulation] in meeting them. ' 452
There is a legitimate interest based on health and safety behind the
suspicionless drug testing.453  The findings of Congress more than
adequately support this professed purpose.454 Having met this prerequisite
for the special needs exception, the legitimate need can be shown to be
"special." As stated in Part II.B.2.a, because there is not a bright-line rule
for what qualifies as a special need, the best measuring tool for determining
if the need outlined in the Act is special will be by comparison to cases that
have applied the special needs exception. 455
There is no language in these cases that would prevent a finding of
constitutionality under the special needs exception. 456  There is no
requirement that the potential harm reach a certain level.457 There is not
even a requirement that there actually be a problem behind the
implementation of the drug testing.458
There are many distinctions between Chandler and IPSA that support
IPSA's constitutionality. For example, in Chandler, the Court found the
need to be "symbolic" rather than "special." 459 Several factors combine to
450. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
451. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
452. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002); see supra note 153 and
accompanying text. IPSA's testing procedures must be shown to be more effective than the
testing currently in place as of November 15, 2005. See Costello, supra note 387. Even
though the penalties are reduced, IPSA's testing procedures can still make the bill effective.
See Penalties Decreased to Get Support for Steroids Bill, supra note 94.
453. See supra notes 311-13, 315.
454. See supra notes 314-23 and accompanying text. In terms of hard data, the need
behind IPSA does not meet the existing standard for what constitutes a special need. See
supra Part II.B.2.b. However, the data supporting the implementation of the regulation in
Earls was based on data of drug abuse in public schools in general. See supra note 355-57
and accompanying text. The evidence of steroid abuse supporting the proposed legislation is
based on evidence of steroid abuse in general as well as steroid abuse of the group being
subjected to suspicionless testing. This alleviates two of the major concerns of the dissenters
in Earls. See supra note 362. Further, according to the Director of the National Institute on
Drug Abuse, the percentage of children and teenagers using steroids could potentially be
higher than the six to seven percent shown by the studies. This is because "[m]any of the
abused substances only became illegal with the passage last year of the amendments to the
Controlled Substances Act; therefore, up until then some forms of anabolic steroids (usually
steroid precursors) could be purchased legally in health food and other commercial
establishments or through the Internet." MLB House Hearing, supra note 3, at 131-32
(testimony of Nora D. Volkow, M.D., Director U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services).
455. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
456. See supra Part ll.B.2.a.
457. See supra note 150-52 and accompanying text.
458. See supra note 354.
459. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
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make the need behind IPSA anything but symbolic. 460 First, the problem of
steroids in professional sports, particularly in baseball, was substantial
enough to be addressed by the President and then Congress. 461 Second,
there is hard statistical and documentary evidence that there is, in fact, a
real problem to be remedied. 462 Third, this problem reaches beyond the
health and safety of the players themselves-it extends to the broader
public, particularly the nation's youth.463 Finally, MLB had failed to
effectively deal with the problem on its own, making federal legislation a
true last resort.464 Even the "less special" purpose of the Act, to restore
integrity to professional sports, will aid the legitimate health and safety
rationale.4 65  According to the findings of Congress, cleaning up the
integrity of the game will aid in effectuating the health and safety
purpose. 466
Some of the Court's reasoning rejecting the constitutionality of the
statute in Chandler is inapplicable to IPSA. Just like the Georgia statute,
IPSA would regulate individuals who "typically do not perform high-risk,
safety-sensitive tasks. '467 The Court has been very specific in indicating
what exactly can constitute a special need, thus IPSA would seem not to
meet the Court's established precedent. 468 However, the Georgia statute
was enacted mainly to set a good example.469 IPSA will go beyond setting
a good example because an actual problem will be directly redressed. 470
Most importantly, Chandler is different because "public safety [was] not
genuinely in jeopardy." 471  Under the proposed legislation, Congress's
findings show that public safety is genuinely in jeopardy.472
Therefore, unlike the Georgia statute in Chandler, the "nature and
immediacy of the government's concerns" justifying the suspicionless drug
460. See supra note 330 and accompanying text. That does not mean that the needs are
then "special." It does show that there is a substantial difference between the basis for the
Georgia statute and IPSA. See supra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
461. See supra notes 1, 4 and accompanying text.
462. See supra notes 355-60 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 314-23, 348 and accompanying text. But see supra note 388.
464. See supra Part I.C.
465. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 314-23 and accompanying text. But see Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I am not persuaded,
however, that the interest in deterring the use of alcohol or drugs is either necessary or
sufficient to justify the searches authorized by these regulations.").
467. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321-22 (1997).
468. See supra notes 329, 331-32, 370-72 and accompanying text. In Chandler, eight
Justices joined in the majority opinion perhaps highlighting a shared view of the importance
of limiting the special needs exception. Of those eight Justices comprising the majority,
seven remain on the Court.
469. See supra notes 331-32 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 314-23, 466 and accompanying text.
471. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.
472. See supra notes 314-23 and accompanying text.
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testing component of IPSA are evident.473 Further, the regulation will be
effective in meeting the legitimate governmental concerns. 474 In Chandler,
the test was "not well designed to identify candidates who violate antidrug
laws," and there was no deterrent effect because the test date was known in
advance.475 In contrast, IPSA narrowly targets a group with a history of
violating antidrug laws, and the drug testing is completely random with no
prior notice. 476 While Dr. Diane Elliot's testimony before the House
Committee on Government Reform suggests that IPSA will not be effective
in combating drug use by the broader public, her assumption rests on her
conclusion that "[a]dolescents know steroids . . . are potentially
harmful. '477 This assumption is not supported by current data which shows
that only fifty-six percent of high school students in 1994 perceived steroids
as harmful as opposed to seventy-one percent in 1992.478 Therefore, IPSA
is an effective means of meeting the legitimate governmental concerns.
Skinner and Von Raab both represent examples of significantly more
substantial and immediate threats to safety.479 However, applying the
framework of Earls, a showing that there are "surpassing safety interests or
extraordinary safety and national security hazards" is not necessary "in
order to override the usual protections of the Fourth Amendment. '480 What
is necessary is that "the safety interest furthered by drug testing [be]
undoubtedly substantial," 481 and the Court has stated that "drug abuse is
one of the most serious problems confronting our society today. 482
The special need justifying IPSA does not reach these high standards of
potential harm; however, this is not fatal to IPSA. The other differences or
trade-offs (in the balancing context) between IPSA and the facts of Von
Raab and Skinner will allow a court to deem special the need to eradicate
steroid abuse in professional sports and the need to eradicate steroid abuse
by children and teenagers.
In Von Raab, the Court relied heavily on the "almost unique mission" of
Customs employees along with the "extraordinary safety and national
security hazards" to find that special needs exist.483 In contrast, the impetus
behind the proposed legislation is a real drug problem still with possible
473. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002); see also supra notes 289, 318-22
and accompanying text. MLB players have exhibited a substantial propensity to cheat in
order to circumvent the steroid regulations already in place. See supra note 289.
474. See supra notes 311-23 and accompanying text.
475. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319-20; see supra notes 331-32, 372 and accompanying text.
476. See Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005).
477. Women & Steroids House Hearing, supra note 41, at 54 (testimony of Diane L.
Elliot, M.D., Professor of Medicine, Oregon Health & Science University).
478. See supra note 45.
479. See supra note 334. These two cases also implicate a more diminished expectation
of privacy than would be applied to MLB players, thus making the balancing test more
difficult to satisfy. See supra notes 429-33 and accompanying text.
480. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002).
481. Id.
482. See supra note 323.
483. See supra note 334.
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disastrous consequences, although probably less immediate. 484 Steroids are
actually particularly dangerous for the very reason that some of the health
and safety concerns are not immediate. Because many of the serious
problems "require months or years to develop," children, teenagers, and the
players themselves will be significantly less inclined to take these threats
seriously. 485
Further, the drug testing program in Von Raab did not lead "to the
discovery of a significant number of drug users. '486 These differences will
help IPSA in the special needs analysis by reducing a court's reliance on an
"extraordinary safety" hazard and on a diminished expectation of privacy
by MLB players. 487
The differences between IPSA and the facts of Skinner are much less
substantial than the differences between the Act and the facts of Von Raab.
In Skinner, the Court relied heavily on the fact that the railway employees'
expectation of privacy was diminished "by reason of their participation in
an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, '488 combined with
the potential to "cause great human loss"'489 to find the special needs test
had been satisfied. There is one important similarity. Unlike the situation
in Von Raab and Chandler, and like the problem behind IPSA, the statute
addressed an actual drug problem with severe consequences. 490 Thus,
taking Skinner to represent the high-water mark for what constitutes special
needs in the suspicionless drug testing context, and the fact that many
factors supporting the implementation of the regulation in Skinner are
present supporting the implementation of the Act, Skinner should not
prevent a finding of special needs.491
Lastly, examining Dimeo, the need supporting IPSA is greater than the
need supporting the implementation of the state regulation.492 Dimeo can
definitively be distinguished on two bases discussed in Part II.B.2.b.493
However, the fact that the balancing test was met with potentially "less"
special needs (although there was an established diminished expectation of
484. See supra notes 314-23 and accompanying text; see also MLB House Hearing, supra
note 3, at 121-23 (testimony of Donald M. Hooten) (explaining how secret anabolic steroid
use by his son so he could make his high school varsity baseball team led to his depression
and eventual suicide); supra note 34 (explaining how steroids can lead to suicide).
485. MLB House Hearing, supra note 3, at 134 (testimony of Nora D. Volkow, M.D.,
Director U.S. Department of Health and Human Services); see supra note 45.
486. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 673 (1989). In
contrast, IPSA can effectively address a real drug problem, that if left alone, poses a real
threat to the health and safety of the nation. This should make the major concern of Justice
Scalia's dissent in Von Raab inapplicable. See supra note 341 (explaining Justice Scalia's
dissent).
487. See supra note 334 (discussing the safety rationale).
488. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989); see supra note
165 and accompanying text.
489. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628; see supra note 169 and accompanying text.
490. See supra notes 381, 383 and accompanying text.
491. See supra notes 479-88 and accompanying text.
492. See supra notes 344-48 and accompanying text.
493. See supra notes 391-96 and accompanying text.
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privacy)494 shows that the need behind IPSA can be considered special
without reaching the high-water mark established by the Court in
Skinner.495
While IPSA will likely be deemed constitutional, to fully ensure this
result, the Government can still help its case. 496 The Government can add
to the already substantial statistical data that shows the far-reaching threat
to the health and safety of the nation's children and teenagers as well as the
players themselves. 497 For example, in her testimony before the House
Committee on Government Reform, Dr. Nora Volkow stated, "More
information needs to be obtained on the true magnitude of abuse."498 In
addition to the statistical data, actual cases of serious injury or death will
further help support the assertion that special needs exist.
CONCLUSION
If IPSA is passed and subsequently challenged, a court would likely find
a special needs exception for IPSA. The Supreme Court has been
extremely careful in limiting additions to the "closely guarded"499 special
needs exception, so the question of whether the basis for the proposed
legislation meets the requirements for a special needs exception could have
far-reaching implications beyond the world of professional sports. 500
At the very least, the looming threat of this legislation has started the
process of ridding MLB of the pervasive problem of steroids and other
performance-enhancing drugs. 50 1 Certainly, the goal of restoring integrity
to MLB has been met and, hopefully, many lives have been saved.50 2 The
end result is now a more even playing field with a strong policy of
deterrence in effect.50 3 If people want to use the BALCOs of this world to
circumvent the new policy and cheat, they will have to go to much greater
494. See supra notes 344-48 and accompanying text.
495. See supra notes 479-88, 491 and accompanying text.
496. This will be particularly important if MLB players were found not to have a
diminished expectation of privacy. See supra note 423 and accompanying text.
497. See supra notes 314-23 and accompanying text. Further studies that connect the use
of steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs by MLB players to the use of steroids
and other performance-enhancing drugs by children and teenagers will be extremely helpful.
See Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(5)-(6) (2005).
498. MLB House Hearing, supra note 3, at 132 (testimony of Nora D. Volkow, M.D.,
Director U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
499. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001).
500. See supra note 377 and accompanying text. The broadening of how personal
privacy can be diminished despite the Fourth Amendment was a primary concern of Justice
Thurgood Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Skinner. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 640-41, 654-55 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
501. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
502. Even the public debate about congressional intervention has brought the problem of
steroids into the mainstream which will hopefully have a deterrent effect. See supra note 77.
503. It appears that Rafael Palmeiro's positive test, which he still denies was due to the
purposeful taking of steroids, may force him into retirement and possibly out of contention
for election to the MLB Hall of Fame.
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lengths.504 At the very least, the situation is better than before the players
agreed to amend the collective bargaining agreement for the second time. 505
Perhaps, as Victor Conte said, "[a] professional baseball player" can no
longer "drive a Mack truck through the loopholes in the [prior] antidoping
program being administered. '50 6
In conclusion, the blatant steroid era is now over. Whether or not this
result was induced by the threat of potentially unconstitutional legislation
does not affect the fact that Congress accomplished its goal and MLB and
other professional sports will be the better for Congress's effort. 50 7
504. See supra notes 52, 79, 289, 405.
505. Despite all the progress, there is still much room for improvement. See Costello,
supra note 387. As Ryan Howard of Philadelphia and Albert Pujols of St. Louis completed
remarkable offensive seasons (thankfully neither of them have been associated with
BALCO), most fans still question the legitimacy of these numbers. The only way to remedy
this is for the testing results to be made available to the public. For example, what was the
date of a player's last test, how was randomness ensured, and what was the result? Without
that, the rumors of steroid use will continue, and it will put into question the careers of the
most dominating players of this generation. See Todd Venezia, Rog, Andy in Drug Furor:
Report: Clemens, Pettitte Named in Affidavit, N.Y. Post, Oct. 1, 2006, at 95.
506. Assael & Keating, supra note 51, at 84.
507. This might not be the situation if Congress's goal was accomplished through the
enactment of IPSA. Because the bill was not enacted, none of Justice Marshall's concerns
(joined by Justice William Brennan) about the erosion of personal liberty and privacy are
present. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 654-55 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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